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This dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay, I  introduce a new measure of 
the firm life cycle and compare its efficacy with the three existing life cycle proxies: ‘cashflow 
patterns’, ‘earned contributed capital mix’, and the firm’s public ‘age’. More specifically, I show 
that two groups of firms, similar in all respects except in their innovations efficiencies, will adopt 
different dividend policies regardless of their calendar age, earned income, or the cash flow 
patterns. I employ a large sample of US manufacturing firms spanning from 1973 to 2017. I find 
that more innovative firms pay lower dividends than the less innovative firms,  irrespective of 
how we describe the life cycle stages. Besides, I perform a comprehensive cross-sectional look at 
the interrelations among various factors, including innovation output, growth, firm life cycle, and 
the dividend payout. I conclude that the intensity of innovation outputs has a direct relation with 
the firm's growth rate, and that, in turn, affects the firm’s life cycle, and thereby its dividend 
policy. 
 
In the second essay, I evaluate the returns to scale, tracking error, and the role of fund 
characteristics on the ETFs risk-return performance. I investigate the impact of asset base size 
growth on the risk-adjusted performance and on the tracking ability of ETFs to their benchmark 
indices. I use the quantile regression approach with survivorship biased free non-leveraged, non-
active, equity-only ETFs sample for ten years. I find that the ‘universe of equity ETFs’ do not 
provide increasing returns to scale. The results show that the size has a more substantial negative 
impact on the highest performing quantiles of the ETF cluster. I also observe that the ‘illiquidity,’ 
‘expense ratio,’ the ‘equal-weighted index composition’ among others are the main key drivers 
that exacerbate the inverse relationship between the size and the performance. However, the 
core blend style and the capitalization-weighted index composition have a positive effect. Finally, 
I conclude a negative relationship between the size and the tracking error. I document that the 
‘illiquidity,’ ‘expense ratio,’ and ‘volatility’ have a positive relationship with the tracking error. 
 










Researchers have long embraced the linkage between a firm’s life cycle and its growth rate.  
According to Mueller (1972), a  business firm has an  'S' shaped growth pattern, with a period of 
slow growth at start-up followed by a period of more robust growth and eventually to maturity 
and stagnation. As the firm progresses through its lifecycle towards maturity, its ability to process 
information deteriorates. Moreover, the risk-taking incentives of the average manager diminish. 
Consequently, net investment in tangible assets decreases. The firm is not able to generate 
innovations to maintain continuous growth, and ultimately, it reaches a point at which the firm 
lacks profitable investment opportunities. This view has almost universally accepted in the 
academic and business communities. For example, Hubbard (2018), among others, suggests that 
in the early stage, the firm invests more to capitalize on its growth opportunities, while during 
the maturity stage, it invests in maintaining the assets in place. Faff et al. (2016) argue that the 
firm’s cash holdings go up in the introduction and growth stages but decrease in the mature and 
shake-out/decline stages as its financing need subsides. 
Mueller (1972)  extends the linkage between the life cycle and growth of the firm to its 
dividend payout decision by proposing that at the mature stage, a value-maximizing firm would 
begin distributing its earnings in dividends.  The literature, in general, agrees on the notion that 
the dividend payout follows a life cycle pattern, and the likelihood of dividend payments is 
positively related to the maturity of the firm (Fama and French, 2001, Grullon et al., 2002, and 
DeAngelo et al. 2006). Consistent with the view, Bulan, and Subramanian (2007) document that 
firms initiate/increase dividends after reaching maturity in their life cycles. According to Flavin 
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and O’Connor (2017),  the degree of dividend payouts increases over the life cycle of the firm, 
but peaks during the maturity stage. 
Although the life cycle theory of dividends is a broadly accepted notion, the debate continues 
about the right proxy to demarcate the stages of a firm’s life cycle, especially its maturity stage.  
The most popular empirical proxy appears to be the firm’s age. However, equating the life cycle 
to the 'calendar age' has been challenged by researchers who offer alternative proxies. For 
example, DeAngelo, et al. (2006) suggest ‘the contributed capital mix’, whereas Dickinson (2011) 
recommends ‘the cash flow patterns’ as an alternative to measure the life cycle stages.  Despite 
the extensive coverage of the firm lifecycle in the existing literature,  a clear demarcation of the 
stages, especially the maturity stage, is yet to emerge.  I argue that growth induced by innovation 
output has a crucial role in dictating the length of each stage and the corresponding dividend 
payout. 
The evidence is aplenty in the literature that links innovations to growth. Chan et al. 
(1990), Doukas and Switzer (1992), Blundell et al. (1999), Toivanen, et al. (2002), and Yang and 
Chen (2003) among others, present evidence that the innovative, small and medium-size firms 
have higher future growth opportunities and profitability than the non-innovative ones. 
Deschryvere (2014) finds that continuous product and process innovators show positive 
associations between R&D growth and sales growth. Coad et al. (2016) find that innovative firms 
grow more than non-innovative ones. Their quantile regression results show that the coefficient 
of innovation is higher for firms with the highest growth rates. Faff et al. (2016) opine that 
innovative firms may continue to grow in a given lifecycle stage longer than less innovative firms. 
Spescha & Woerter (2019) suggest that innovative firms based on R&D activities have higher sales 
growth rates than non-innovative firms. 
At least theoretically, a persistently innovative firm should be able to produce sustainable 
growth and, therefore, avoid paying dividends forever. Realistically, we should expect a highly 
innovative firm to stretch its life far beyond the “maturity” stage, irrespective of what proxy (age, 
contributed capital, or cash flow pattern) we use to measure it. For example, suppose there are 
two firms that are similar in all respects except their innovation efficiency, the one with 
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demonstrably high innovation efficiency would pay significantly lower dividends than the one 
that exhibits poor innovation performance.  
When using innovation efficiency as a proxy for the life cycle, a firm reaches its maturity 
once its innovation performance decreases to the level of the industry average. On the other 
hand, a poor performer in the innovation contest reaches the maturity stage much sooner than 
their counterparts in the same stage of the life cycle regardless of the proxies used. These are 
the issues I address in this paper and hypothesize the most appropriate proxy for a firm’s life 
cycle. I contribute to the literature by first defining a firm’s life cycle based on its innovation 
efficiency and then demonstrating how innovation might explain cross-sectional differences in 
dividend payments between two firms that are otherwise similar in all respects. Besides, I re-
examine and perform a comparative study of the most popular life cycle proxies in the extant 
literature. 
The results show that innovation superiority prevails in measuring  “maturity” irrespective 
of how it is defined. I find that there is no defined life cycle for all firms. Instead, the innovation-
based criteria define each firm’s life cycle individually. A young firm may fall in the declining stage 
if the firm loses its creativity, while an old firm that may otherwise qualify for the maturity stage 
based on age may continue to function as a growth firm and might decide not to pay (or raise) 
dividends.  Using innovation measure, I can see the life cycle occurring in three stages; first, when 
a firm’s innovation efficiency is higher than the industry average, the firm is at the growth cycle. 
It is likely to follow a low-dividend policy.  Second, when the firm’s efficiency level mirrors the 
industry,  the firm is in the maturity stage and may pay higher dividends. Finally, a firm with a 
below-industry level of efficiency is expected to be at the declining phase, but its dividend 
decision would likely depend on the management quality. 
Thus, I claim that the maturity hypothesis (as explained by the dividend payout) is better 
defined by innovation output intensity. The existing studies lack sufficient empirical researches 
that connect the innovation outputs or innovation success with the firm’s business life cycle, and 
I attempt to fill the gap. 
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Likewise, Dickinson (2011) study cashflow patterns during a corporate life and defines 
life-cycle stages in terms of a firm’s cash flow pattern. However, to the best of my knowledge, 
cashflow maturity as proposed by Dickinson has not been tested for the dividend payout. In this 
research, I put it in perspective and investigate whether the cashflow maturity of a firm is aligned 
with the maturity hypothesis associated with the dividend payouts.  I claim that this is an added 
contribution to the literature. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I provide the literature review. Section 3 
introduces the main hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data and univariate analysis and 
empirical methodologies. Section 5 contains the discussion and presentation of the findings, 
theoretical underpinnings, and the policy implications, and finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1. Debate on the Life Cycle Measurement 
 
As discussed, there is no consensus yet in the literature on the definition of the life cycle1, 
although the ‘firm age’ has been the most popular proxy.2  In sharp contrast to the abundant 
empirical supports for ‘age’ to measure the life cycle, a few recent papers repudiate ‘age’ as a 
useful life cycle proxy. DeAngelo et al. (2006) argue that it is not the ‘age’ but the ‘earned to 
contributed capital ratio (RE/TA)’ is an excellent proxy to measure the firm life cycle. In contrast 
to DeAngelo’s findings, Megginson and Von Eije (2008) find no relationship between retained 
earnings to total equity ratios and the propensity to pay dividends in their study listed in EU 
 
1see Yan, Zhipeng and Zhao, Yan, A New Methodology of Measuring Firm Life-Cycle Stages (2010). International 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2010, Volume 4, Issue 4, 579-587.   
2 A debate, however, exists among scholars about the type of relation between age and the life cycle.  Some scholars  (see 
Anthony, J. H. & Ramesh, K., 1992; Bhattacharya et al., 2004; DeAngelo et al., 2010; Seifert and Gonenc, 2012; Chincarini et 
al., 2016; Kieschnick and Moussawi, 2018) believe that the relationship is linear, while others (e.g., Freeman, Carroll, Hannan 
(1983), argue that  the firm age follows ‘non-linear’ ‘U shape’ relation across life-cycle stages as the new firms grow faster but 




countries. However, they do find that age, size, and past profitability are positively related to the 
propensity to pay dividends. Dickenson (2011), on the other hand, discover that it is the cash flow 
pattern that accurately defines the firm life cycle. Faff et al. (2016) further claims that while these 
variables (‘earned to contributed capital ratio,' ‘firm size’ and ‘age’) do provide some indication 
of a firm’s life cycle progression, they have limitations and hence are unlikely to be the reliable 
life cycle proxies on their own. The paper attempt to address the issue with a new method called 
multiclass linear discriminant analysis (MLDA) to generate the main life-cycle proxy, as a function 
of age, earned to contributed capital ratio, profitability, and asset size.  The debate goes on for 
over two decades now, and the search for better life cycle measurement also continues on. In 
this context, I intend to extend the discussion from a new perspective that an ‘innovation output 
intensity’ plays a crucial role in the formation of the firm life cycle stages. 
 
2.2 Life Cycle Patterns, and the Dividend Policy: 
 
Following the dividend irrelevancy theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961) under the 
assumption of the perfect capital market, earlier studies devoted their attention to explaining 
firms’ dividend decisions by introducing market imperfections (e.g., information asymmetry). In 
more recent years, the focus has turned on market variables and firm characteristics. Fama and 
French (2001) investigate the patterns and the determinants of dividend payout policy over the 
period 1926-1999 and point to life cycle factors playing an essential role in the cash dividends 
payout decisions. Fama and French (2001) documents that dividend-paying firms are large and 
highly profitable and the firms that never paid dividends are small and unprofitable. The small 
firms have many investment opportunities that require external financing because their capital 
spending is far higher than their earnings. Fama and French (2001) concluded that dividend 
payers have the characteristics of mature firms, while firms that have never paid dividends have 
the features of young, fast-growing firms. In sum, the Fama-French (2001) study confirms a 
strong association between the patterns of dividend payment and firm characteristics that 
govern a firm’s life cycle stage.  While Fama-French(2001) concludes the decreasing propensity 
to pay dividends during their sample duration, Amin et al. (2015) and Floyd et al. (2015) find that 
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for US industrial firms, the declining propensity to pay dividends reverses after 2002. They 
present evidence of a consistent and steady surge in the percentage of dividend-paying firms 
from 2002 to 2012.  DeAngelo et al. (2004) also show that while the number of firms paying 
dividends have fallen, the total amount of cash dividends by US industrial firms has increased 
over time. 
Another major line of research is to analyze whether firms vary their dividend payments 
according to the stages of their life cycle in which they find themselves. Mueller (1972) proposed 
the life cycle hypothesis of dividends suggesting that a firm’s dividend policy should be 
determined based on where it is in its life cycle. On Mueller’s foundation work, Grullon et 
al.(2002) come up with the maturity hypothesis, saying that dividend payout signals the maturity 
of the firm.  Julio and Ikenbeery (2004) test the maturity hypothesis and explain disappearing and 
reappearing dividends in which they use firm age as the variable to define the firm maturity. 
Likewise, DeAngelo et al. (2006) show that the likelihood of dividend payment is related positively 
to the maturity of the firm measured by RE/TA or RE/TE. Their findings are in alignment with the 
view that younger firms are in the capital infusion stage, which limits their ability to pay 
dividends. In contrast, mature firms are profitable with few investment opportunities, which 
allows them to pay dividends in the stockholders.3 
Bulan et al. (2007) examine whether the firm life cycle affects firms' decisions to initiate 
dividends. They find that mature firms with a larger size, profitability, and cash reserves, fewer 
growth options, tend to start dividend payout. The argument is that as a firm becomes mature, 
the management has less incentive to preserve cash for future projects, and is, therefore, in a 
better position to make dividend payments. Thus, dividend payout is an integral part of the firm 





3 See illustrations in Habib, Ahsan, and Hasan, Mostafa Monzur, Corporate Life Cycle Research in Accounting, 
Finance, and Corporate Governance: A Survey and Directions for Future Research (August 20, 2018). 
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2.3. Life Cycle Proxies and Their Limitation 
 
The Anthony & Ramesh (1992) paper is perhaps one of the earliest empirical work on 
accounting-based measures for classifying life cycle stages. The paper uses four variables: age, 
sales growth, dividend yield, and capital expenditure. They provide strong empirical supports for 
‘age’ as a lifecycle determinant. Bhattacharya et. (2004) uses 'firm age' to study the trends in pro 
forma reporting. They find that "young" firms are significantly less profitable, more liquid, higher 
P/E, and book-to-market than older firms in their industry. The univariate measures such as firm 
size and age assume that the firm progresses linearly over the life cycle; however, some of the 
recent studies suggest that a firm’s movement over the life cycle is dynamic (Helfat and Peteraf, 
2003).  In a recent study, Dickinson (2011) shows that the classification of firms into different life 
cycle stages based on Anthony and Ramesh (1992) is mostly erroneous because the underlying 
variables fail to capture the attributes of the firm life cycle. The paper argues that firms of the 
same age can learn at different rates because of imperfections in their feedback mechanism. 
Likewise, Faff et al. (2016) discuss that extant studies mostly use the listing year to measure firm 
age; however, many firms continue as unlisted private firms for an extended period. They argue 
that this introduces noise into the measurement of firm age. The paper study whether the 
corporate decision-making process is interdependent over the firm’s life-cycle, and it uses the 
‘age of the firm’ as one of the life cycles proxies in the multivariate measurement methods. The 
empirical research finds that firm age is not an appropriate proxy for the firm life cycle 
measurement.  The authors make the point that while univariate proxies such as age and firm 
size do provide some indications about firm maturity, they are unlikely to capture a firm's life 
cycle on their own to their inherent limitation. To address the problem, they employ a new 
method (multi-class linear discriminant) as a function of multiple relevant variables and study the 
corporate decision makings. They find that their new measure is more effective in comparison to 
the cash flow pattern proxies, as mentioned by Dickinson (2011) and the traditional proxy of ‘firm 
age’ (adjusted for industry and size effects) to study the corporate policy makings. The paper 
explains, like firm age, cash flow pattern, and size can also evolve non-monotonically across life-
cycle stages and hence are not a good life cycle proxy. 
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The interesting observation is that despite repudiation, a firm’s age continues to be 
broadly used in studies linking the life cycle to financial decisions other than dividends. DeAngelo 
et al. (2010) examine the effect of the life cycle on the likelihood of conducting SEOs. Using the 
number of years since listing (firm age), and dividend history, as proxies for the firm life cycle, 
the authors show that corporate life cycle stages have statistically and economically meaningful 
influences on the decision to conduct an SEO. Seifert and Gonenc (2012) examine the impact of 
a firm life cycle on firms' decisions to issue or repurchase equity or debt. They provide evidence 
in support of the life cycle theory of financing choices using ‘age’ as a life cycle proxy. They show 
that firms in the earlier stage of the life cycle (proxied by age) issue (repurchase) more (less) 
equity than do older firms. Keasey et al. (2015) introduce family firms in the life cycle literature 
and examine whether the life cycle of family firms influence the association between leverage 
and ownership. Their sample consists of European listed firms over the period 2000 thru 2009. 
They use firm age as the proxy for the life cycle and find that the relationship between ownership 
and leverage is positive (negative) for mature (growth) stage firms.  Chincarini et al. (2016) find 
that firm age (a proxy for firm life cycle) captures the time-variation of beta (systematic risk) and 
its relation to the cost of equity capital. Kieschnick and Moussawi (2018) use firm-age (since IPO) 
as a life cycle proxy and show that the level of debt a firm uses has a negative association with 
the age. They also show that this relation is driven primarily by the interaction between a firm's 
age and its governance features. 
To sum up, new firms are young but are also more likely to fail, which means that young 
firms can occupy both the introduction and the decline stages of the life cycle. An old firm can 
keep growing if they are inventing the new products and process aligning with the market 
demand. Therefore, the old firm is not necessarily mature, and similarly, a young firm may not 
be a growth firm either. I argue that 'growth,' induced by innovation output, can indeed shape 
the lifecycle patterns more appropriately. As Dickinson (2011) argues, the firm life cycle differs 
from firm age because firms of the same age can learn at different rates due to imperfections in 
their feedback mechanisms. She also highlights the fact that prior literature such as Anthony and 
Ramesh (1992) and Black (1998) rely on the development of the monotonic patterns on variables 
such as - age, sales growth, dividend payout, or some composite of these variables to assess life 
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cycle. However, according to Dickinson, the drawback in those researches is that a uniform 
monotonic distribution of life cycle stages across firms is inherently assumed. The assumption 
that a firm moves monotonically through its life cycle is an apparent fallacy because a business 
firm is a portfolio of multiple products, each at potentially in different product life cycle stages. 
I summarize the table below with the major life cycle proxies in use in the current 
literature. In this list, I introduce a new life cycle proxy ‘the innovation intensity.’ I claim that the 
new proxy is proven more accurate and economically meaningful than any other existing proxies 
currently in use because the innovation success of a firm is accountable for much of the firm 
growth that better explains the dividend life cycle. 
 
No. Paper Proxy Life Cycle Stages 
1 Miller and 
Friesen (1984) 
Age and sales growth Identify five life cycle stages – birth, growth, 
maturity, revival, and decline. Show each stage 
on average lasts for six years. 
2 Anthony and 
Ramesh (1992) 
The dividend, sales, capital expenditure, and 
firm age 
First accounting study to document the 
relationship between the life cycle and the stock 
returns. Identify three stages – growth, mature, 
stagnant 
3 Bhattacharya et 
al. (2004) 
Univariate measures – age, size, and 
profitability 
 
4 DeAngelo et al. 
(2006) 
Earned(internal) Contributed(external) 
Capital Mix, Retained Earnings to Total Assets 
or Retained Earnings to Total Equity 
Young, Mature, and Old. The underlying premise 
is that young firms have little or no retained 
equity and rely on contributed(external) equity, 
resulting in low RE/TE ratios. Mature firms, on 
the other hand, have greater access to internal 
funds (retained equity) and less need for 
contributed equity; hence they have larger RE/TE 
ratios. 
5 Dickinson (2010) Cash flow patterns from operating, investing 
and financing 
Five stages – introductory, growth, maturity, 
shakeout, and decline stages based on cash flow 
pattern classification; however, they do not 
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relate their life cycle stages with the dividend 
payout. 
6 Faff et al. (2016) MLDA  
(multiclass linear discriminant as a function of 
age, RE/TE, profit(EBIT/asset), and sales per 
year) 
They enhanced the Dickinson methodology by 
performing linear discriminant analysis. They 
classify life cycle into four stages -  introductory, 
growth, maturity, shakeout/decline stages 
7 This study (my 
dissertation) 
Innovation Intensity (degree of innovation 
success of a firm based on citation weighted 
patents output and dollar value-based patent 
output for firm ‘f’ on year ‘t’) 
The idea is that life cycle patterns are driven by 
growth, which, in turn, is driven by the degree of 
innovation success of the firm. Persistent 
innovators can push the maturity phase longer in 
comparison to the less innovative firms. I 
propose three phases - introductory, growth, and 
mature. I use Kogan et al. (2017) innovation 




2.4. Factors Affecting Firm Growth 
 
Is there a relation between growth and life cycle? 
The traditional determinants of firm growth are firm-specific characteristics such as age, 
size, legal structure, and innovation. These papers have demonstrated that small, young, and 
independent businesses grow at the fastest rate (Almus and Nerlinger, 1999). Some papers have 
entirely different views on growth, such as Geroski and Gugler's (2004) document that growth is 
mostly random, and there is little correlation in growth rates over time.  It argues that there is 
more variation in growth rates within firms than across firms over time. Benartzi, Michaely, and 
Thaler (1997) states that dividend reductions are associated with an improvement in the growth 





How does age affect firm growth? 
Herriott et al., (1984) and Levitt and March (1988) find a positive impact of age and 
explains that new firms face up to difficulties associated with lack of market recognition and 
economies of scale, and lack of alliances with partners. However, over time, these firms can 
strengthen their available resources, managerial knowledge, and the ability to handle 
uncertainty. Loderer et al. (2016) show that as firms mature, they become more rigid in exploiting 
benefits from the assets in place. They do not consider renewing their growth opportunities and 
hence, suffer a decline in firm value. Grullon et al. (2002) established the “maturity hypothesis” 
that argues that as firms mature, the investment and growth opportunities diminish. As a result, 
the expectations for return on their investments will fall. As the expected return deteriorates, 
companies dispense cash from their prior investments to the shareholders as dividends instead 
of turning the reserve cash into new ventures. 
How does r&d affect firm growth? 
The literature extensively discusses the effect of R&D investment on firm growth. 
Concerning future performance, many studies provide evidence showing that R&D investment is 
positively associated with future performance4. Grabowski and Muller (1978) assert that R&D 
expenditure plays an essential role as the innovative driver to increase the future growth 
opportunities and profitability of the firms. However, some studies report that R&D investment 
has no or minimal negative impact on future performance5. Chun et al. (2014)6 report that R&D 
investment directly affects future profitability as it enables the development of new products 
and new technologies. R&D investment can reduce costs through efficient production 
technology, which has a positive impact on future performance. 
 
4 see extensive discussion in Yoo et al. (2019) that cites the following papers Bublitz, B.; Ettredge, M. The information 
in discretionary outlays Advertising, research, and development. Account. Rev., 1989, 64, 108–124. 5., Kim, J.K.; Seo, 
J.S. The effects of R&D expenditures on the firm's value. Korean Int. Account. Rev., 2007, 20, 207–229. 6. and Chung, 
A.J.; Park, S.B. The effects of business groups on the association between R&D intensity and firm value. Korean Int. 
Account. Rev. 2014, 57, 38–58 
5 Lee, Y.H.; Lee, H.J. Impact of R&D expenditure size on financial performance focused on the IT service industry. J. 
Korea Soc. It Serv. 2009, 8, 1–14. 8.  and Choi, M.S.; Kim, Y.C. The relation between excess R&D expenditure and 
future earnings growth of a firm. Korean Account. Inf. Rev. 2011, 29, 1–28  
6 Chun, D.P.; Chung, Y.H.; Bang, S.S. Measuring R&D productivity of the major Korean firms: Using data envelopment 
analysis. Korean Acad. Soc. Account. 2014, 19, 173–190 
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However, the effects of R&D investment are not always positive7. For example, if R&D 
investment fails, sunk costs will increase, which can negatively affect the firm value. Amir et al. 
(2007) provide evidence that in industries with high R&D intensity, R&D investment has 
considerably more uncertainty than intangible investment assets, while in industries with low 
R&D intensity, there is no difference between the two. Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) argue that 
firms pursue technology innovation through R&D investment leading to revenue generation 
through new product development that positively affects profitability. They also explain that the 
R&D investment has a positive impact on the profitability of the firm because it improves 
production efficiency due to cost reduction. 
Based on the findings of the papers discussed above, the evidence on the effects of R&D 
on firms’ value is mixed depending on the degree of success of resulting innovations. This 
prompts us to use patents and citations as measures of success of the R&D investments. 
 
2.5. Innovation, Growth, and the Dividend Policy: 
 
Bulan and Subramanian (2007) extensively discussed the work of Knight (1921), 
Schumpeter (1934), and Mueller (1972) to explain that in its initial stages, the firm invests all 
available resources in developing innovation and improving its profitability. Afterward, the 
enterprise will proliferate as it enters new markets and expands its customer base before any 
significant competition can arise. While the innovative firms are growing, competitors begin to 
enter the market, adopting and improving upon the original firm's innovations. As the existing 
market becomes saturated and new markets are harder to find, the growth of the firm begins to 
slow down. To maintain growth and profitability, firms need to regenerate innovations. 
Anthony and Ramesh (1992) suggest that the capital expenditure is highest for growth 
firms, while firms in revival and decline have higher cash dividends. Gaver and Gaver (1993) find 
significantly lower dividend yields for growth firms than for non-growth firms. Fama and French 
(2001) show that firms with excellent investment opportunities payout substantially less or are 
 
7 Kay, N.M. The R&D function: Strategy and structure. Tech. Chang. Econ. Theory 1988, 282–294 
13 
 
much more likely to payout nothing. Moreover, the authors find that firms have become less 
likely to pay dividends, whatever their characteristics (such as size, profitability, or investment 
opportunities) during the period 1978–99. Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004a, 2004b) and Huergo 
(2006) find a negative impact of age on the probability to innovate, which shows that the 
youngest cohorts are conditional on the peculiarities of their activity and size, prone to innovate 
more than the oldest ones. Segarra and Teruel (2014) results show that investing in R&D 
increases the likelihood of becoming a high-growth firm. They use the Spanish CIS database to 
analyze the asymmetries of the innovation phenomenon from two different approaches. The 
paper considers the heterogeneous impact that R&D effort may exert on the firm growth 
distribution. 
 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
As evidenced from the literature review, the life cycle of a firm is closely related to its 
expected growth rate. A successful firm goes through an extraordinary growth in the first cycle; 
a sustainable growth period follows in the second cycle and growth rate subsidies in the final 
cycle. Theoretically, the growth rate may reach zero if the firm chooses inaction to prevent the 
growth from falling to that level. The one that is more successful in innovation activities before 
reaching the final maturity stage is likely to pay lower dividends than the other firms that are less 
innovative. Innovation output helps firms to gain a competitive advantage over their competitors 
so that the firms can generate abnormal returns for their shareholders. However, innovation, 
through R&D, new products, or patent development, is an expensive and risky long-term 
investment. Firms need to take long-term risks to innovate; this means that only the responsible 
corporate governance with the right incentive can make such risky but worthy decisions on behalf 
of shareholders. Good corporate governance involves setting up long term strategies that 
support economic efficiency, financial stability, and sustainable growth. It ensures companies' 
access to capital for long-term investment in innovation, which is one of the critical factors to 
achieve long-run sustainable growth.  The interlink between good governance and innovation 







Prior research evidence supports the link8 between sound corporate governance system and 
the innovation. A stable higher growth backed by great innovation makes it possible for the firm 
to achieve a more robust growth rate that can extend the growth phases of the firm’s life cycle. 
Besides, the innovative firms have more investment opportunities, and hence they better utilize 
the firm's assets in comparison to their less innovative counterparts. As a result, during the final 
stage (the lower growth phase or the maturity phase) of the firm life cycle, the innovative firm is 
expected to pay a lower dividend. The less innovative firms, on the other hand, will likely run out 
of investment opportunities and are expected to distribute higher payout in the form of the cash 
 
8 Baysinger et al. (1991) study the link between specific board characteristics and innovation and concluded that there 
is a definite link between the proportion of internal board members and R&D expenditure per employee. Tylecote and 
Visintin (2007) states that corporate governance is one of the main determinants of innovation and technological 
change. Tribó et al. (2007), Wu (2008), Latham & Braum(2009), Zhang et al. (2014), and few other papers claim that 
corporate interest has grown in the influence of governance mechanisms on innovation decisions in recent years. These 
papers argue that innovation efforts depend on factors that are influenced by corporate governance, such as ownership 
structure, shareholder identity, or the functioning of the board of directors. Aghion, van Reenen & Zingales (2013) 
develop a theoretical model to test the relationship between institutional ownership and innovation. They find a similar 
result as in previous literature, showing that larger institutional ownership is directly related to more innovation, as 
measured by cite-weighted patents. Brunninge et al. (2007) and Shapiro et al. (2015) suggests that the external 
directors on the board have a positive effect on strategic changes, including innovation. Similarly, Balsmeier et al. 
(2014) find that external directors with experience who sit on the boards of technology companies have a positive and 
significant effect on applications for patents in the companies which they advise and supervise. Chen (2012) and 
Lacetera (2001) find that firms that have board members with higher educational level tend to have a more thorough 
understanding of R&D processes and external environments, so they will be better positioned to implement R&D 
activities. Chen (2012) also finds that R&D investment is negatively related to board size. Lhullery (2011) indicates 
that certain board practices that address shareholders, such as duality, may individually have a positive influence on 
R&D investments, and this is in line with the results as found by Driver and Guedes (2012) for the UK data. However, 
if R&D does not necessarily boost firm growth as suggested by the mixed empirical evidence, then it does not make 




dividend.  Thus, based on the discussion,  I present a general conceptual framework of empirical 
research in the figure, as shown below. 
 
As discussed, a feature of a mature company is a higher rate of dividend payout. I argue 
that if the two groups of firms in the same life cycle stage are pursuing different dividend payouts, 
say one firm with a lower dividend and another firm with a higher dividend, then Grullon’s 
maturity hypothesis implies that the firm that pays a lower dividend is not in the maturity phase 
yet, suggesting that the firms (that are paying lower dividends) are the innovative firms that can 
extend the growth phase. At the same time, while innovative firms keep growing, their non-
innovative counterparts are already in maturity as they started paying a higher dividend. As 
depicted in the figure, I posit that the firm with a sound governance system would, via innovation, 
be able to extend the growth period, and thereby, avoid increasing the dividend payout ratio 
during the mature phase of the firm life cycle. This model of corporate governance that promotes 
innovation will help the firm achieve its long-term goal of increasing shareholder value. Grounded 
on all these analyses backed by the comprehensive literature review and the research questions 
that I posed earlier, I attempt to test the working hypothesis that between two groups of firms 
16 
 
with similar characteristics (industry affiliation, size, re/te, life span among others) , the one with 
higher and persistent innovation, will produce more vigorous growth and, therefore, have a 
lower dividend payout.  Further, I investigate which definition of life cycle describes the firm 
maturity better: is it the firm age or the re/te or the cashflow pattern or the innovation intensity? 
I examine whether the two firms in the same age group but significantly different innovation 
success, initiate/increase the dividend payout at the same time? The same question goes to the 
firms of similar retained earnings ratio (re/te) and the cash flow patterns that demand an 
investigation. The underlying idea is that if the lifecycle proxies are efficient, then the maturity 
hypothesis and dividend payout should hold regardless of the life cycle measurements. 
 
4. SAMPLE, VARIABLES, AND THE DATA 
 
I use the data sample starting from 1973 because the disclosure of R&D expenditure is 
made compulsory for US firms in 1972 (see Hall and Oriani, 2006). I perform the initial analysis of 
the full sample data in Compustat from 1973 through 2016. I find that the majority of R&D firms 
in the Compustat database belong to the Manufacturing Industry Sector9. My observation is 
consistent with Autor et al. (2018) and Helper et al. (2012),10 who indicate that the manufacturing 
sector creates about two-thirds of U.S. R&D spending and patents even though they account for 
less than one-tenth of U.S. private non-farm employment. I use the Compustat database and 
focus on the US manufacturing firms (SIC classes 2000-3399). Consistent with the existing 
literature, I exclude firms that have average net operating assets, sales revenue, or market value 
of equity less than $1 million. I also exclude firms with missing values of variables I employ in the 
analyses. 
I cross-reference Kogan et al. (2017), Arora, et al. (2019) and NBER to merge the 
patent/citation database with the manufacturing sample. Kogan et al.(2017) develop two 
innovation measures based on innovation output. According to the paper, the first innovation 
 
9 see appendix on the distribution of data in the full Compustat sample 
10Helper et al. (2012) claim that a manufacturing share in US R&D spending is more than 68%. They document the 
fact based on the data from the National Science Foundation's Business R&D Survey. 
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measure is the dollar value of stock market reaction weighted patents output11. The paper 
explains that authors estimate the total dollar value of innovation produced by a given firm ‘f’ in 
year ‘t’ based on stock market reaction after the patent is published. It further illustrates that 
they sum up all the dollar values of patents ‘j’ that are granted to a firm ‘f’ on  year ‘t’. 
𝛳𝑓,𝑡
𝑠𝑚   = ∑ ᶓ𝑗𝑗∈𝑃𝑓,𝑡     , where 𝑃𝑓,𝑡 denotes the set of patents issued to firm 𝑓 in year 𝑡. 
The second innovation output measure of Kogan et al.(2017) is the citation-weighted (cw) 
patents based on the following model: 
𝛳𝑓,𝑡
𝑐𝑤    = ∑  (1 +
𝐶𝑗
?̂?𝑗
𝑗∈𝑃𝑓,𝑡  ) 
Where, 
𝐶𝑗  𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑗 
′ ′ 𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ′𝑡′  for firm ‘f’ 
?̂?𝑗  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜  𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Kogan’s et al. also mention that they normalized the above two measures with the book value of 
the firm (Compustat variable ‘at’).  I use both models above and normalized to total firm asset as 
a citation weighted innovation index to study the impact of innovation output on dividend 
payout. I also use their patent/citation data that are made available on their paper’s online 
appendix12 to match with the CRSP merged Compustat firms. I identify the data based on 
‘lpermno’ and ‘year’. I confirm the data match with other common Compustat variables that they 
have in common in the dataset. 
I create three subsamples to study the innovation differential impact on the dividend 
policy. The first one is the ‘less innovative’ sample consists of the firms that have below-median 
innovation index, the second one is the ‘innovative’ sample consists of the firms with above-
median innovation index, and the third one ‘persistent innovative’ sample consists of the firms 
 
11 Kogan, L., Papanikolaou, D., Seru, A. and Stoffman, N., 2017. Technological innovation, resource allocation, and 
growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(2), pp. 665-712 
 
12 data https://paper.dropbox.com/doc/U.S.-Patent-Data-1926-2010-t5nuNWnTH1InM0gyxkizL 
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with minimum three years of consecutive citation weighted patents. Three subsamples provide 
a unique opportunity for a comprehensive empirical study on the impact of innovation intensity 
on the firm’s growth, and therefore, on its life cycle. I present the list of all the variables of 




5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis: 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables of interest in the research. Panel 
A provides the mean, median, and standard deviation of all the variables used in the empirical 
regression models. Panel B includes descriptive information based on the three sub-samples: less 
innovators, innovators, and persistent innovators. It shows that less innovative firms have higher 
dividend payout compare to the other higher innovators. The persistent innovators have the 
lowest dividend payout among the three sub-groups. The pattern is opposite for innovation-










13 Please, see in the appendix 
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Table 1-Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables of interest. On the left side, I report the summary statistics of the sample. On the right side, I present the descriptive statistics for 
three sub-samples: Below Median Innovators, Above Median Innovators, and the Persistent Innovators. I exclude the data with missing values for total assets, sales, and retained earnings. 
I also exclude the data with total assets and sales revenue of less than one million. The sample consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. All the 
ratios are normalized with total assets except for retained earnings, which normalized with total equity.  
  Summary Statistics     Descriptive  Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   Mean (Less Innovator) Mean (Above Avrg Innovators) Mean (Pers. Innovators) 
divratio 97,586 0.0102532 0.0179087 0 0.1036962 
 
0.0127192 0.009604 0.0084059 
rdratio 69,615 0.0794518 0.1178053 0 0.8913236 
 
0.0159702 0.0897263 0.2328962 
amratio 70,646 0.0041438 0.0082118 0 0.0497061 
 
0.0036278 0.0051674 0.0039582 
lagRDint 65,025 0.3971088 2.341973 0 32.48936 
 
0.0188546 0.3660818 1.520077 
k_index 34,804 0.278142 0.8028689 0 59.83537 
 
0.1343905 0.2415297 0.9198633 
tsm 34,804 0.1241707 0.3198766 0 12.66584 
 
0.0553538 0.1385747 0.3025869 
CitWtedIndx 34,804 0.1539713 0.7020182 0 59.10666 
 
0.0790367 0.1029549 0.6172764 
k_npatratio 34,804 0.0576313 0.1651519 4.41E-06 9.948834 
 
0.0348008 0.0429479 0.1953191 
growth 91,496 0.0168501 0.2909636 -1.138524 1.372723 
 
-0.0061366 0.0089629 0.044308 
saleratio 98,030 1.198443 0.6191078 0.0003824 3.473551 
 
1.229964 1.068829 1.257369 
reteratio 97,686 -0.1538316 1.374183 -10.6917 0.8362576 
 
0.1629035 -0.0797781 -0.4988989 
retaratio 97,686 -0.1942011 1.936304 -117.0538 3.185593 
 
0.1615436 -0.0963028 -0.591824 
lvrgratio 97,373 0.0205816 0.0739933 -0.1262101 0.5900591 
 
0.0183442 0.0138055 0.0272686 
capxratio 97,006 0.0559828 0.0491085 0.0003321 0.271612 
 
0.0567416 0.0563519 0.0550293 
roa 98,025 -0.0135602 0.2192432 -1.474333 0.2552592 
 
0.0326349 0.0016685 -0.0666269 
ebitdaratio 97,750 0.0802126 0.2028395 -1.218589 0.397767 
 
0.1266225 0.0917925 0.0292786 
size 98,030 4.954555 2.200123 0.4725005 10.5502 
 
5.466657 5.217467 4.302368 
fcfratio 52,819 -0.0081381 0.3616535 -9.236738 42.21759 
 
0.0346974 0.0025942 -0.0542718 





Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. I report only the statistically significant pairwise 
correlation between the variables. The significance of the correlation between the respective 
variables is in alignment with the existing literature. For example, firms with profitability 
measured by ROA or EBITDA are showing a positive relationship with the dividend payout ratio. 
Likewise, the firm age has a positive relationship with the dividend payout. R&D and Amortization 
of Intangibles have a negative relation with the dividend. Similarly, the innovation index shows a 
negative relationship with the dividend payout.  
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Table 2-Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlation matrix of the variables of interest. I exclude the data with missing values for total assets, sales, and retained earnings. I also exclude the data with total 
assets and sales revenue of less than one million. The sample consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. I exclude the data with missing values 
for total assets, sales, and retained earnings. I also exclude the data with total assets and sales revenue of less than one million. The sample consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, 
and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. All the ratios are normalized with total assets except for retained earnings, which normalized with total equity. 
  divratio rdratio amratio lagRDint k_innIndex CitIndex k_npatratio growth saleratio reteratio retaratio lvrgratio capxratio roa ebitdaratio size fcfratio age 
divratio 1 
                 
rdratio -0.2434 1 
                
amratio -0.0706 0.0281 1 
               
lagRDint -0.1091 0.4928 -0.0257 1 
              
k_innIndex -0.0505 0.2279 0.0389 0.0662 1 
             
CitWtedIndex -0.0639 0.1681 0.0109 0.0437 0.9411 1 
            
k_npatratio -0.1438 0.3584 -0.0052 0.1137 0.7012 0.6864 1 
           
growth -0.0526 0.234 0.0775 0.3651 0.0844 0.0851 0.1502 1 
          
saleratio 0.1606 -0.2997 -0.1331 -0.2914 -0.0552 0.0022 0.0029 0.05 1 
         
reteratio 0.2592 -0.6517 -0.0733 -0.3277 -0.2329 -0.2032 -0.4415 -0.2272 0.2269 1 
        
retaratio 0.2013 -0.549 -0.0629 -0.291 -0.2006 -0.1652 -0.3963 -0.203 0.1647 0.8856 1 
       
lvrgratio -0.0682 0.042 -0.0197 -0.002 0.1084 0.1313 0.2133 0.0418 0.0707 -0.1203 -0.09 1 
      
capxratio 0.0704 -0.0365 -0.169 -0.0438 0.0305 0.0125 -0.0014 0.0051 0.1342 0.1117 0.0729 0.0009 1 
     
roa 0.267 -0.6766 -0.1265 -0.3836 -0.223 -0.1996 -0.3906 -0.2227 0.2856 0.7205 0.6229 -0.0949 0.064 1 
    
ebitdaratio 0.3035 -0.717 -0.0312 -0.441 -0.2278 -0.2089 -0.4105 -0.1769 0.3918 0.7371 0.6267 -0.0891 0.1301 0.9022 1 
   
size 0.4023 -0.4098 0.0544 -0.169 -0.1422 -0.1906 -0.4215 -0.1355 -0.0843 0.4362 0.3541 -0.2041 0.0308 0.3987 0.4438 1 
  
fcfratio 0.1835 -0.5685 0.0185 -0.3712 -0.2086 -0.1848 -0.3674 -0.1823 0.2272 0.587 0.6105 -0.026 -0.1092 0.6763 0.7239 0.3329 1 
 
age 0.452 -0.3548 -0.151 -0.1881 -0.0649 -0.0563 -0.1338 -0.1015 0.2643 0.3316 0.2591 -0.0246 0.0962 0.2974 0.332 0.3987 0.2155 1 
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The preliminary investigation of the relationship between the key variables in the sample 
data is consistent with the correlation matrix, as shown in the bin diagram below. Figure 1 shows 
that when there is high R&D, firms either do not pay or pay a very little dividend.  However, for a low R&D 
ratio, dividend payout is significant. 
 
Figure 1 - Inverse Relation Between Dividend Payout and R&D Expenses 
Likewise, in figure 2, the bin scatter plot diagram depicts a direct relationship between 
the age and the dividend payout. However, the dividend payout doesn’t seem to be monotonous 
as the firm ages through. 
 




In Figure 3, the sample data show a strong inverse relationship between the R&D and the 
firm age. The graph shows a clear pattern that as firms ages thru, R&D steadily going down. 
 
Figure 3 – Firm Age vs R&D Ratio in the Manufacturing Industry 
 
5.2 Methodology  and Multivariate Analysis 
I summarize the empirical approach that is employed in sequential order as follows: 
a. In the first step, I examine the impact of innovation intensity on firm growth, focusing on 
R&D-rich US manufacturing firms. 
b. In the second step, I examine whether dividend payout is a function of firm maturity14. I 
investigate the existence of higher dividend payout during the ‘mature phase’ as defined 
by each of the popular life cycle proxies – cash flow patterns, re/te ratio, age, and the 
innovation intensity. 
c. In the third step, I investigate the relationship between the ‘degree of innovation’ and the 
‘dividend payout.’ I create two models each for a) the dollar-based dividend payout, and 
b) the probability-based dividend payout (likelihood of paying a dividend). First, I run the 
regression on the full sample. Then I perform a comprehensive analysis by dividing the 
 
14 Maturity as defined by firm age, retained earnings (DeAngelo et al,2006), and cash flow pattern Dickinson (2011) 
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samples into three sub-categories: a)  less (or no) innovation, b) above-average 
innovation, and c) persistent innovation. 
d. In the final step, I investigate the dividend payout behavior of the three groups of firms 
(less innovative, innovative, and persistent innovative). I select firms that belong to the 
‘same life cycle stage’, such as ‘maturity’ or ‘growth’ or ‘introduction’ phase as defined by 
popular life cycle proxies but are different in innovation intensity. In this section, I prove 
the working hypothesis that between groups of firms with similar characteristics (industry 
affiliation, size, life span/age, re/te, cashflow15), the one with a higher degree of 
innovation output has a lower dividend payout. 
I largely follow the existing literature such as Fama French(2001) and DeAngelo et al. 
(2006), among others, to design the empirical models and to determine the model specification 
for the above scenarios, and I discuss the details of the models and the empirical results in the 
following sections. 
 
5.2.1 Growth and Innovation: 
 
In section 5.2.1, I study the impact of innovation intensity on the firm’s sales growth. The 
effect of innovation on sales is different for different types of firms (Coad and Rao, 2008; Mason 
et al., 2009) and firms with varying levels of R&D intensity (Del Monte and Papani, 2003). The 
existing literature document heterogeneity in a firm’s innovativeness across and within the 
industry sector. Besides, I find no prior literature that explores the relationship between 
innovation and sales growth in the US manufacturing sector. Therefore, even if the main 
objective of the research is to examine the impact of innovation on the life cycle and dividend 
payout, I recognize that I first need to establish the role of innovation in sales growth focusing on 
the manufacturing industry. 
 
15 I do not find existing literature that test the dividend behavior based on the Dickinson(2011) cashflow pattern. 
This is the additional contribution to the literature.  
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To examine the impact of innovation on firm growth, I designed the panel regression 
model as in equation one below. In this model, I regress the (lagged) firm sales, age of the firms, 
and the (lagged) R&D intensity against the growth rate of a firm ‘i’ at time t. I follow a similar 
approach as in  growth vs innovation literature such as Spescha  and Woerter(2018)16 ,  Demirel 
and Mazzucato (2012)  and Colombelli  et al.(2013)17: 
 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽1 ln (𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽1 ln (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) + ɛ𝑖,𝑡     ---- Equation 1 
where, 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡= 𝑙𝑛 (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡) – ln (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) , 
𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐾𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑙. (2016)  𝑜𝑟  
𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦  
𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
 as in Demirel and Mazzucato (2012)   
The dependent variable is the firm’s growth rate, which is the log-difference of the annual 
percentage change in sales. As a robustness check, I also use five-year rolling asset growth as an 
independent variable and confirm the consistency in the result.18 I define R&D intensity as the 
R&D for the firm (i) in year t, scaled by its sale in year t-1. I divide R&D intensity by lagged value 
of sales to avoid potential problems that arise due to the correlation between the right-hand side 
‘sales’ and ‘R&D’ variables (see Demirel and Mazzucato, 2012). In the model, I control for the size 
of a firm’s sales and its age. I follow existing literature19 to cross-reference and to come up with 
the model specification including the control variable.  Besides R&D intensity, I also use Kogan et 
al. (2017)’s citation weighted patent and stock market-weighted patent output measures as an 
innovation intensity variable. 
 
16 See page 12 and 13 on Andrin Spescha & Martin Woerter, 2019. "Innovation and firm growth over the business 
cycle," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(3), pages 321-347, March. 
17 See page 13 on  Alessandra Colombelli, Naciba Haned, Christian Le Bas. On firm growth and innovation: Some 
new empirical perspectives using French CIS (1992–2004). Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, 
2013, 26, pp.14-26. ff10.1016/j.strueco.2013.03.002ff. ffhal-01079383f 
18 See Appendix A - Table C 




I perform the Hausman specification tests to check whether the fixed or random effects 
is a better fit.  The examination reveals that the fixed effect is a better choice. Further, the fixed 
effect specification allows for the correlation of the unobserved firm-specific effects with the 
independent variables. I use both the firm fixed effects and the time fixed effects (to control for 
the years). 
According to Grossman and Helpman (1994A), a firm’s R&D investment is an endogenous 
strategy that is implemented based on the costs and potential outcomes of R&D as well as the 
institutional, legal, and economic settings that determine the success and profitability of these 
outcomes. Therefore, to address the endogenous nature of R&D investments, I use the System 
GMM. The data sample has large N (firms) and small T(year), so, I think, that the GMM is an 
appropriate method to address the possible endogeneity in this particular panel settings (see the 
similar line of literature Demirel and Mazzucato (2012), and Colombelli  et al.(2013) among other 
that use GMM in a similar setting).  
The regression results based on equation one is in Table 3. Specifications 1, 2, and 3 in 
Table 3 represent the FE regression with robust standard errors each for Kogan’s innovation 
output-based index, citation weighted patent output, and R&D intensity. I also check with 
clustered standard errors on the firm, and I got the same results as with the robust option. So, I 
report only the  ‘robust’ FE regression result in Table 3.  The last specifications are from the 
system GMM for the corresponding regression on Kogan’s innovation output-based index; 


















Table 3-Impact of Innovation Intensity on Firm Growth 
In this table, I regress the (lagged) firm sales, age of the firms, and the innovation intensity against the growth rate of firm i at 
time t. 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽1 ln (𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽1 ln (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) + ɛ𝑖,𝑡      where,  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡= 𝑙𝑛 (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡) – ln 
(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1).  The dependent variable is the firm’s growth rate, which is the log-difference of the annual percentage change in sales. 
I follow the existing literature to design the model and to select the model specification20. I define R&D intensity as the R&D for 
the firm (i) in year t, scaled by its sale in year t-121. I divide R&D intensity by lagged value of sales to avoid potential problems that 
arise due to the correlation between the right-hand side ‘sales’ and ‘R&D’ variables. In addition, to R&D, I also check innovation 
impact on growth using Kogan et al. (2017) innovation index as well as citation weighted patents. Specification 1 reports the 
result from the FE regression with Robust standard error with Kogan’s innovation index as the main independent variable.; 
specification 2 reports the result from the FE regression with Kogan’s citation weighted patents output as an independent 
variable.  Specification 3 reports the result for the laggedRDIntensity  as an independent variable. Specification 4, 5, and 6 are 
from the Sys-GMM regression for the endogeneity checks. I perform the Hausman test that reveals that FE is better-fit compare 
to the RE.  The sample consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






lnlagsaleratio -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.276*** -1.014*** -1.014*** -0.860*** 
 (-97.69) (-97.70) (-92.23) (-126.87) (-125.95) (-125.93) 
       
lnage 0.117*** 0.114*** 0.105*** 0.459*** 0.452*** 0.151*** 
 (5.22) (5.08) (9.85) (5.63) (5.52) (9.55) 
       
Kogan_index 0.0248***   0.0585***   
 (10.72)   (17.55)   
       
CitWtedIndex  0.0348***   0.0635***  
  (12.88)   (13.52)  
       
lnlagRDint   0.0903***   0.153*** 
   (46.78)   (47.05) 
       
L.growth    0.0394*** 0.0371*** 0.0446*** 
    (9.19) (8.54) (13.09) 
       
_cons -0.444*** -0.430*** -0.0931* -1.685*** -1.653*** -0.0506 
 (-5.36) (-5.19) (-2.39) (-5.57) (-5.45) (-0.88) 
N 
adj. R-sq 


































t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 3 shows that the impact of innovation (in all three measures as in spec1, 2, and 3) 
on firm growth is positive and statistically significant. The results of the three specifications are 
showing that innovation intensity induces positive growth for the firm.  However, as shown in 
the table, the lagged sales variable has a significantly negative impact on growth. And the ‘firm 
 
20I cross reference and extended the models following  Hall and Mairesse (1995) and Demirel et al. (2012).  I chose control variable based on 
Yasuda (2005) 
21 SEE Demirel et al. (2012).   
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age’ variable is a firm’s public age. It has a positive and statistically significant impact on the fixed-
effect as well as in the SYS-GMM model. The positive sign of age is unexpected because the effect 
of age on growth is often adverse, suggesting that growth slows down as firms ages (Dunne and 
Hughes, 1994). The positive sign for public age (listing age in the stock exchanges) maybe because 
of its association of  “publicly-held” for a longer time22. The firms that trade in the stock market 
have a lower financial constraint in compare to the private firms. So, lower financial constraints 
may play a positive role in publicly traded aging firms. I do not report statistically insignificant 
control variables. 
 
5.2.2 Maturity Stage and Dividends 
 
In section 5.2.2, I examine whether the dividend payout is a function of the firm maturity 
based on different life cycle proxies. The mainstream literature that defines the life cycle based 
on the firm age document that dividend payouts increase along the lifecycle until peaking in the 
mature stage23. Dividend initiators exhibit mature tendencies (Fama French,2001; Grullon et al., 
2005). Moreover, the dividend-paying growth firms pay small dividends in comparison to 
dividend-paying mature firms (Brockman and Unlu 2009). Theoretically, firms paying higher 
dividends are already in the maturity phase that implies that the firms paying low or no dividends 
are in the growth phase. So, in this section, I check the impact of the innovation intensity on the 
dividend payout. I examine whether firms with low innovation intensity signals the maturity 
phase of the firm life cycle. Similarly, firms with high growth but no or low dividend payout 
suggests that these firms are currently in the growth phase. Therefore, I primarily study the 
dividend life cycle and how they differ based on innovativeness, but similar in firm characteristics, 
including age, retained earnings, and cash-flow patterns. 
I follow Owen and Yawson (2010) and use RE/TE to group firms into quantiles 
representing the lifecycle in young or mature or old/decline stages. The higher the RE/TE ratio, 
 
22 Carpenter and Peterson(2002) argue that when firms start to trade on the exchanges, they are subject to relaxed 
financial constraints which has positive effect on the firm growth. 
23 See Flavin and O’Connor (2017) 
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the mature the firm is. Likewise, based on Dickinson's (2011) cashflow patterns, I group firms into 
introduction, growth, mature, and shakeout/decline stages. Similarly, I use firm age to group 
firms into different ‘age’ quantiles to study if the older firms pay higher dividends. 
Table 4 presents the median value for different life cycle stages measured by the most 
popular life cycle proxies. The data shows a clear pattern along the life cycle stages. The life cycle 
model of dividends follows maturity hypothesis implying that the mature firms pay significant 
dividends than growth firms regardless of the lifecycle measures employed.  In alignment with 
the expectation, the median values of each of the proxies in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C shows 
that the maturity stage has the highest dividend payout in comparison to other stages. The 
innovation, however, has an inverse relation with the dividend payout.  Unlike the other three 
proxies, innovation intensity shows the lowest median value during the maturity phase. 
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Table 4-Median Values by Life Cycle Stages for the Most Popular Proxies 
In this table, Panel A presents the median dividend payout by the life cycle stage proxied by each of the three popular life cycle measures, such as age, re/te, and cashflow pattern. In Panel 
A -exhibit 1, I first sort the firms by age and then group in to four quartiles. In Panel B, I group the firms based on Dickinson (2011) cashflow patterns(see appendix table 4 for reference). In 
Panel C, I group the firms based on re/te (ratio of retained to total equity). In Panel B, I present the new measure ‘the innovation intensity’. Panel B-exhibit 1 shows how the dividend payout 
pattern evolves as the citation weighted patent output increases. The second exhibit shows how the dividend payout pattern evolves when the innovation output index (combined both the 
citation weighted and stock market dollar value-weighted output) increases.  Dividend payout is either dividend to assets or dividend to annual sales as indicated. The sample consists of 
Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. 
Panel A – Existing Life Cycle Measures: 
1. Dividend payout and lifecycle using 'age' quartiles 
  Age quartile 1 (young firms ) Age quartile 2 Age quartile 3 Age quartile 4 (old firms) 
Div to Assets 0.0201628 0.0177098 0.0139483 0.0181977 
Div to Sales 0.0157739 0.0129941 0.0133836 0.0197956 
     
2. Dividend payout and lifecycle using Cashflow Patterns  of 'Dickinson (2011)' life cycle stages 
  Introduction Growth Mature Shakeout/decline 
Div to Assets 0.0098069 0.012661 0.0212916 0.018121 
Div to Sales 0.0080905 0.0126352 0.0189042 0.013897 
     
3. Dividend payout and lifecycle using 'RE/TE' DeAngelo et al. (2006) life cycle stages 
                      Introduction             Growth Mature   
Div to Assets 0.0217522 0.0163264 0.0235058   
Div to Sales 0.0200189 0.0164639 0.0247742   
      
Panel B -  Innovation Output Based Measure: 
1. Dividend payout and lifecycle using 'Citation Weighted Innovation Output based on Kogan et al.(2016)' 
  
innovation index quartile 1  
(lowest innovators) 
  
innovation index quartile 2 innovation index quartile 3 innovation index quartile 4  
(highest innovators) 
  
Div to Assets .0162476 .0140002 .0113865 .006076 
Div to Sales .0169939 .0132373 .0100431 .00924993 
2. Dividend payout and lifecycle using  ‘Citation and Stock Market Value Weighted Innovation Index based on Kogan et al.(2016)' 
  
innovation index quartile 1  
(lowest innovators) 
  
innovation index quartile 2 innovation index quartile 3 innovation index quartile 4  
(highest innovators) 
  
Div to Assets .0141634 .012478 .0117392 .0098505 
Div to Sales .0136382 .0114052 .0105774 .0104740 
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Extant literature primarily tests the maturity hypothesis of the dividend life cycle using 
firm age and re/te ratio. As far as I am aware, the empirical studies are not available on how the 
dividend payout relates to the firm maturity based on the cash flow patterns. Therefore, in Table 
5 and Table 6, I further confirm whether the ‘maturity stage’ (defined by cash flow patterns, age, 
re/te, and the innovation intensity) captures the higher dividend payout.  The idea is that when 
a firm matures and if the higher dividend payout is the function of a firm maturity, then any 
appropriate life cycle proxies should be able to detect the higher dividend payout of the mature 
stage. 
In Table 5 and Table 6, I regress the ‘mature stage’ from different life cycle measurements 
against the dividend payout to confirm that dividend payout is related to maturity, regardless of 
the life cycle proxies used.  The model is below: 
 
Div ~ F(life cycle stage + Control Variables)   ---------- equation 2 
Prob(Payer = 1) = F(life cycle stage + Control Variables)   -------------- equation 3 
 
Table 5 reports the results from the cross-sectional OLS regression in which the dependent 
variable is the dollar amount of the dividend paid to total asset ratio. In Table 6, I present the 
likelihood of paying dividends due to the firm life cycle stages. I run the logistic regression in 




Table 5 -Impact of Lifecycle Stages on Dividend Payout Based on Four Lifecycle Proxies  
This Table reports the impact of life cycle stages on dividend payout regardless of the life cycle proxies used. The dependent variable is the dollar value of dividend to total asset ratio. 
Specification 1 thru specification 4 shows the impact of each life cycle stage on dividend payout based on Dickinson(2011) cashflow patterns. Specifications 5, 6, and 7 are based on DeAngelo 
et al. (2006). Specification 8 thru 11 are based on age category quantiles, and specification 12 is from the less innovative firms, Specification 13 is from average innovative firms and 
Specification 14 reports the impact of persistent innovations(highly innovative firms) on the dividend payout. All regressions are robust stand error. I reported statistically significant control 
variables. The objective of the table is to show that the dividend payout is a function of firm maturity regardless of the life cycle measures in the literature. The sample consists of Compustat 





























 divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio divratio 
lnage 0.0151*** 0.0135*** 0.0153*** 0.0161*** 0.0156*** 0.0173*** 0.0138***     0.00835*** 0.00838*** 0.00863*** 
 (44.49) (39.24) (44.96) (47.50) (45.22) (55.45) (44.45)     (45.24) (45.09) (46.70) 
               
lnebitdarati
o 
0.00657*** 0.00670*** 0.00670*** 0.00622*** 0.00689*** 0.00695*** 0.00558*** 0.00676*** 0.00658*** 0.00674*** 0.00655*** 0.00610*** 0.00610*** 0.00613*** 
 (33.26) (34.56) (33.79) (32.54) (34.95) (37.49) (31.60) (33.66) (32.21) (32.99) (32.82) (54.84) (54.91) (55.21) 
               
reteratio 0.00449*** 0.00436*** 0.00457*** 0.00427***    0.00588*** 0.00667*** 0.00716*** 0.00595*** 0.00416*** 0.00422*** 0.00416*** 
 (11.93) (12.01) (12.06) (11.63)    (13.22) (14.63) (14.60) (14.06) (22.06) (22.31) (22.09) 
               
lvrgratio -0.0446*** -0.0480*** -0.0444*** -0.0430*** -0.0453*** -0.0511*** -0.0358*** -0.0454*** -0.0355*** -0.0384*** -0.0277*** -0.0323*** -0.0324*** -0.0324*** 
 (-11.05) (-11.55) (-11.01) (-11.33) (-11.63) (-13.69) (-11.20) (-10.72) (-8.65) (-9.23) (-8.02) (-35.25) (-35.27) (-35.45) 
               
CitWtedInd
ex 
-0.00145*** -0.00159*** -0.00145*** -0.00114** -0.00175*** -0.00207*** -0.00184*** -0.00167*** -0.00131** -0.00148*** -0.000703*    
 (-3.46) (-3.55) (-3.45) (-3.09) (-3.82) (-4.14) (-4.23) (-3.57) (-3.20) (-3.30) (-2.17)    
               






0.000801*** 0.00126*** 0.00195*** 0.000816*** -0.00154*** -0.00159*** -0.00166*** 
 (-2.68) (-5.81) (-2.86) (-1.97) (-3.69) (-3.58) (-4.33) (3.58) (5.59) (8.64) (3.75) (-12.63) (-13.01) (-13.72) 
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capxratio -0.0199*** -0.0163*** -0.0198*** -0.0135*** -0.0201*** -0.0134*** -0.0153*** -0.0163*** -0.0123*** -0.0123*** -0.0139*** -0.0196*** -0.0201*** -0.0193*** 
 (-9.57) (-7.90) (-9.53) (-6.47) (-9.60) (-6.52) (-7.61) (-7.59) (-5.78) (-5.70) (-6.89) (-15.39) (-15.84) (-15.25) 
               
DIntrod -0.00160***              
 (-4.24)              
               
DGrowth  -0.00565***             
  (-26.97)             
               
DMature    0.04023***            
   (18.28)            
               
Ddeclinesh
akeout 
   0.00272**           
    (3.28)           
               
retecat1du
m 
    -0.00418***          
     (-15.37)          
               
retecat2du
m 
     -0.00663***         
      (-38.15)         
               
retecat3du
m 
      0.00963***        
       (47.59)        
               
agecat1du
m 
       -0.00709***       
        (-26.09)       
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agecat2du
m 
        -0.00790***      
         (-36.63)      
               
agecat3du
m 
         -0.000648**     
          (-3.01)     
               
agecat4du
m 
          0.0113***    
           (52.23)    
               
innovlevel1
dum 
           0.01046***   
            (11.62)   
               
innovlevel2
dum 
            -
0.000430*** 
 
             (-3.47)  
               
innovlevel3
dum 
             -0.02067*** 
              (-14.96) 
               
_cons -0.0276*** -0.0194*** -0.0279*** -0.0338*** -0.0268*** -0.0316*** -0.0279*** 0.0284*** 0.0273*** 0.0253*** 0.0229*** -0.00316*** -0.00237*** -0.00312*** 




0.235         
28742 
0.248         
28742 
0.235         
28742 
0.245         
28755 
0.224         
28755 
0.250         
28755 
0.278         
28742 
0.184         
28742 
0.196         
28742 
0.165         
28742 
0.245         
29126 




0.157         
t statistics in parentheses 





Table 5- Impact of Lifecycle Stages on the Propensity to Pay Dividend Based on Four Lifecycle Proxies  
This Table reports the propensity to pay dividends due to the life cycle stages regardless of the life cycle proxies selected. The dependent variable is the binary ‘dividend payer’(equals 1 if  
DVC  > 0 , 0 otherwise). Specification 1 thru specification 4 are the propensity of paying dividends due to the life cycle stage based on Dickinson(2011) cashflow patterns, specifications 5, 6, 
and 7 are the propensity of paying dividend due to life cycle stage based on DeAngelo et al(2006). Specification 8 thru 11 are the propensity of paying dividend based on age category 
quantiles, and specification 12 is the propensity of paying dividend due for the less innovative firms(less than median R&D/TA), Specification 13 is the propensity of paying a dividend for 
the average innovative firms(above average R&D/TA) and Specification 14 reports the propensity of paying a dividend for the persistent innovations. I reported statistically significant control 
variables. I examine if the propensity of paying a dividend  is a function of firm maturity based on all the popular life cycle proxies in the literature. The sample consists of Compustat US 
manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. I extended the cross-sectional logit regression model of Fama-French(2001). 
 (4) 
Dick. - I 
 
(3) 
Dick. - G 
 
(1) 
Dick. - M 
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 DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer DivPayer 
lnage 0.616*** 0.590*** 0.642*** 0.623*** 0.564*** 0.625*** 0.592***    0.480*** 0.589*** 0.613*** 0.623*** 
 (70.21) (65.45) (73.87) (70.93) (65.51) (71.06) (69.78)    (42.93) (67.63) (68.73) (72.47) 
               
lnebitdaratio 0.0790*** 0.0865*** 0.0779*** 0.0828*** 0.0660*** 0.0827*** 0.0647*** 0.0826*** 0.0812*** 0.0844*** 0.0832*** 0.0856*** 0.0845*** 0.0852*** 
 (19.66) (21.73) (19.56) (20.40) (17.51) (20.70) (17.29) (20.66) (20.45) (21.02) (20.87) (21.49) (20.98) (21.48) 
               
reteratio 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.152***    0.158*** 0.153*** 0.154*** 0.161*** 0.148*** 0.154*** 0.145*** 
 (14.43) (14.58) (14.32) (14.41)    (14.94) (14.81) (14.48) (14.84) (14.27) (14.48) (14.22) 
               
lvrgratio -1.837*** -1.899*** -1.801*** -1.838*** -1.576*** -1.830*** -1.658*** -1.686*** -1.707*** -1.811*** -1.615*** -1.645*** -1.877*** -1.535*** 
 (-14.13) (-14.35) (-14.41) (-14.12) (-12.96) (-14.23) (-14.11) (-13.46) (-13.40) (-14.01) (-13.48) (-14.19) (-13.96) (-14.28) 
               
CitWtedIndex -0.0737*** -0.0766*** -0.0677*** -0.0743*** -0.0736*** -0.0750*** -0.0782*** -0.0677*** -0.0687*** -0.0729*** -0.0626***    
 (-3.85) (-3.88) (-3.72) (-3.85) (-3.91) (-3.88) (-4.06) (-3.74) (-3.83) (-3.81) (-3.58)    
               
saleratio 0.0304*** 0.0143** 0.0318*** 0.0283*** 0.0223*** 0.0279*** 0.0236*** 0.0290*** 0.0234*** 0.0295*** 0.0366*** 0.0314*** 0.0262*** 0.0363*** 
 (5.60) (2.61) (5.86) (5.21) (4.18) (5.14) (4.43) (5.37) (4.34) (5.39) (6.78) (5.85) (4.82) (6.82) 
 
capxratio -0.338*** -0.273*** -0.221*** -0.347*** -0.420*** -0.322*** -0.276*** -0.318*** -0.306*** -0.340*** -0.295*** -0.238*** -0.343*** -0.249*** 
 (-5.82) (-4.71) (-3.80) (-5.99) (-7.32) (-5.57) (-4.86) (-5.58) (-5.40) (-5.87) (-5.20) (-4.24) (-5.92) (-4.35) 
 
DIntrod -0.127***              
 (-9.63) 
 
             
DGrowth  -0.111***             
  (-16.56) 
 
            
DMature   0.0832***            
   (15.59)            
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Ddeclineshakeout    -0.0654           
    (-2.92)           
               
               
retecat1dum     -0.251***          
     (-26.58)          
               
retecat2dum      -0.0304***         
      (-6.11)         
               
retecat3dum       0.154***        
       (25.06)        
               
agecat1dum        0.260*       
        (22.29)       
               
agecat2dum         -0.201***      
         (-29.94)      
               
agecat3dum          -0.0179***     
          (-3.43)     
               
agecat4dum           0.166***    
           (27.32)    
               
Innovlevel1dum            0.173***   
            (34.71)   
               
Innovlevel2dum             -0.0556***  
             (-10.18)  
Innovlevel3dum              -0.160*** 
              (-26.33) 
_cons -1.578*** -1.428*** -1.708*** -1.598*** -1.348*** -1.594*** -1.574*** -2.520*** -1.319*** -1.618*** -1.127*** -1.543*** -1.536*** -1.569*** 
 (-47.09) (-40.25) (-51.13) (-47.68) (-39.12) (-47.54) (-47.74) (-48.65) (-38.95) (-49.00) (-28.27) (-47.11) (-44.52) (-47.56) 








The results in Table 5 and Table 6 confirm that the mature stage has a statistically 
significant positive impact on the dividend payout. Likewise, age and re/te ratio have a 
statistically significant positive relationship with the dividend payout. The older the firm, the 
higher the propensity to pay dividends. The same is the case for the retained earnings ratio; the 
higher the re/te ratio, the higher the likelihood of paying a dividend. The innovation index, 
however, shows that the higher the innovation intensity, the lower the propensity to pay 
dividends. Specification 1 and Specification 2 also show that the introduction and growth phase 
have a statistically negative relationship with the dividend payout. For all the regression in table 
5 and table 6, I control for firm profitability, sales size, and leverage ratio as in Fama-
French(2001). I provide the evidence that regardless of the firm life cycle used; dividend payout 
is higher in the mature stage. 
Further, I perform robust testing for each life cycle proxies interacting with high 
innovation dummy and low innovation dummy. The result is in Table 13. I find a consistent result 
that the higher innovation interaction weakens the dividend payout impact of the mature stage. 
The results are highly significant. 
 
5.2.3 Degree of Innovation and Dividends 
 
In section 5.2.3, I design the model to study the relationship between the degree of 
innovativeness and the dividend payout. In the first stage (5.2.3.1), I estimate the dividend 
payout regressions for the dividend payout amount vs. the innovation intensity measured by the 
innovation index. In the second stage, I investigate the propensity (likelihood) of paying a 
dividend based on the innovation intensity. In both cases, I perform the analysis based on cross-









5.2.3.1. Innovation intensity and dividends 
 
Table 7 reports the cross-sectional OLS regression result on the impact of innovation 
intensity on the dollar value of dividend payout. The main independent variable is the innovation 
index. I control for firm age, retained earnings, profitability as proxies by ebitdaratio, capxratio, 
and sales ratio. Specification 1 is the result of the below-median R&D sample; specification 2 is 
from the above-median R&D sample; specification 3 is from the persistent innovators. The last 
column is the result of the full sample. The dependent variable is the dividend payout (a dollar 
amount). 
Div ~ F(innovation intensity as measured by innovation index + Control Variables)   ---- equation 4 
div ~ InnovationIndex + control variable   ---  Spec.  Full Sample (eq 4.1) 
 
The full sample is sorted by the innovation index in lowest to highest order to find the 
median value. I then divide the sample into two groups: a) less innovative firms that have citation 
weighted patent output below median value, and b) innovative firms that have citation weighted 
patent output above the median value. I also create the third sample with persistent innovators 
that has a citation weighted patent for at least three consecutive years. The results in Table 7 













Table 6-  Impact of Innovation Intensity on Dividend Payout 
In Table 7, I report the cross-sectional regression result on the impact of innovation intensity on the dollar value of dividend 
payout. The dependent variable is the dividend ratio (cash dividend payout normalized by total asset). The main independent 
variable is the innovation index. I control for firm age, retained earnings, roa, capxratio, and sales ratio. Specification 1 is the 
result of the below-median innovation sample; specification 2 is from the above-median; specification 3 is from the persistent 
innovators. The last column is the result of the full sample. The sample consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the 










 divratio divratio divratio divratio 
CitWtedIndex -0.00213* -0.2040*** -0.8014*** -0.00888*** 
 (-2.21) (-5.85) (-7.34) (-9.12) 
     
lnage 0.0118*** 0.0215*** 0.0177*** 0.0186*** 
 (9.17) (17.81) (34.97) (41.37) 
     
ebitdaratio 0.0172*** 0.0674*** 0.101*** 0.0740*** 
 (5.00) (14.14) (36.07) (35.11) 
     
lvrgratio -0.0146* -0.0866* -0.0214* -0.00869 
 (-2.46) (-2.44) (-2.03) (-1.42) 
     
lnfcfratio 0.000822* 0.00201*** 0.000371 0.000965*** 
 (2.22) (4.80) (1.85) (5.66) 
     
saleratio 0.00246** -0.00446*** -0.00202*** -0.00182*** 
 (3.28) (-5.21) (-4.57) (-5.00) 
     
_cons -0.0386*** -0.0610*** -0.0616*** -0.0603*** 











t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
 
I find a statistically significant negative relationship between the div payout and the 
innovation index. However, if when examining the coefficients, the persistent innovators have a 
more substantial negative impact in comparison to the other specifications in the Table. Similarly, 
the above-median innovators also show a higher negative impact compare to their less 
innovative counterparts.  I confirm the statistical significance of the differences in coefficients for 





5.2.3.2  Innovation intensity and propensity to pay dividends 
 
I examine the propensity to pay a dividend based on the cross-sectional logit regression. 
In this case, I mostly follow the approach adopted by Fama & French (2001) that employs the 
logit regression using distinct characteristics of dividend payers and non-payers as explanatory 
variables. The formal model used by Fama-French (2001) is as follow: 
𝑌𝑡 = β0 + β1 𝐸𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑡  + β2 𝑑𝑇𝐴𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑡   + β3 𝑇𝐴𝑡 +  ɛ𝑖,𝑡       -- Equation 6 
where 
𝑌𝑡 : the decision to pay dividends. It equals 1 for payers at time t and 0 otherwise. 
𝐸𝑡  : earnings at time t 
𝑇𝐴𝑡 : total assets at time t 
𝑑𝑇𝐴𝑡 : 𝐴𝑡 – 𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 the growth rate of assets 
𝐸𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑡, 𝑑𝑇𝐴𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑡  & 𝑇𝐴𝑡 are proxies for profitability, growth, and size respectively 
Profitability, growth, and size are the distinct characteristics of payers and non-payers.  I use sales 
growth to total asset ratio as a growth proxy. I design the logit models as presented below: 
Div Payer𝑡 ~  F(innovation intensity + Control Variables)   ------------------ equation 7 
Div Payer𝑡~ InnovationIndex + control variable .....................................   Spec.  Full Sample (eq 7.1) 
Where, 
 'Div Payer𝑡′ is the likelihood of paying a dividend. It equals 1 for payers at time t and 0 otherwise. 
The results are in Table 8.  I repeat the same process as in equation 5 with the same 
specification in the right-hand side, except, the dependent variable, in this case, is the dummy 1 








Table 7 – Impact of Innovation Intensity on the Propensity to Pay Dividend Payout 
In Table 8, I report the propensity to pay a dividend based on the degree of innovation.  I follow Fama-French(2001) to model 
the logit regression.  The dependent variable is the binary variable ‘dividend payer’(equals 1 if payer, 0 otherwise).  The main 
independent variable is the innovation index. I control for firm age, retained earnings, roa, capxratio, and sales ratio. 
Specification 1 is the result from the below-median R&D sample; specification 2 is from the above-median R&D sample; 
specification 3 is from the persistent innovators. The last column is the result from the full sample. The sample consists of 












 divpayer divpayer divpayer divpayer 
     
CitWtedIndex -0.431* -0.735*** -0.773*** -1.144*** 
 (-2.52) (-4.60) (-6.97) (-14.34) 
     
lnage 5.202*** 3.644*** 2.942*** 3.227*** 
 (12.43) (20.87) (35.80) (44.90) 
     
ebitdaratio 4.335*** 5.989*** 5.280*** 5.531*** 
 (4.04) (8.02) (10.43) (14.60) 
     
lvrgratio -27.81*** -25.57*** -32.09*** -33.22*** 
 (-4.86) (-4.22) (-7.98) (-11.17) 
     
saleratio 0.530** 0.128 -0.0924 -0.0952 
 (2.78) (1.20) (-1.34) (-1.76) 
     
lnfcfratio 0.0913 -0.173** -0.125*** -0.122*** 
 (1.00) (-3.14) (-3.71) (-4.57) 
     
capxratio -1.870 -6.143*** 5.733*** 1.153 
 (-0.76) (-3.61) (5.31) (1.41) 
     
_cons -20.67*** -14.35*** -11.27*** -12.30*** 











t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
In Table 8, I examine the propensity to pay dividends based on the degree of 
innovativeness. I use cross-sectional logit regression with the dependent variable as dividend 
payer (1 for the payer, 0 for non-payer).  In this table, I find a very similar pattern as in the cross-





degree of innovativeness, the more substantial the innovation, the stronger the negative 
relationship between the dividend payout and the innovation intensity. 
5.2.4. Dividend Payout: Same Life Cycle Stage but Different Degree of Innovation 
Finally, in section 5.2.4, I examine the propensity to pay a dividend by three groups of 
firms (less innovative, innovative, and persistent innovative) that belong to the ‘same life cycle 
stage such as ‘maturity’ or ‘growth’ as defined by popular life cycle proxies but are significantly 
different in degree of innovation. The purpose is to test the primary hypothesis that among 
groups of firms in the same life cycle stage and with similar characteristics (industry affiliation, 
size, life span/age, re/te, cashflow25), the one with a higher degree of innovation output has a 
lower dividend payout. 
 
5.2.4.1 Life Cycle Defined by Cash Flow Pattern: Same Stage but Different Degree of Innovation 
 
In this section, I test whether groups of firms (based on the degree of innovations) in the 
same life cycle stage as defined by cash flow pattern (Dickinson,2011) have a similar propensity 
to pay dividends. I run the following cross-sectional logit regression similar to Fama-French (2001) 
in which the dependent variable is the div payer equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 
otherwise. 
Div Payer𝑡~ life cycle stage defined by cashflow pattern
26 + InnovationIndex + control variable  -- equation 
9 
Table 9 tests the main hypothesis for the firms in the same life cycle stage defined by the cashflow 
patterns.  Table 9 Panel A reports the result for the firms in the life cycle stage '3-mature' 
(Dickinson,2011). Similarly, Panel B presents the result for the firms in the life cycle stage, '2-
Growth' (Dickinson,2011). I run the logit model of equation 9 on the full sample as well on the 
other three sub-samples based on a different degree of innovation: 1. Below average innovators 
 
25 I do not find existing literature that test the dividend behavior based on the Dickinson(2011) cashflow pattern. 
This is the additional contribution to the literature.  





2. Above-average innovators, and 3. Persistent Innovators. In both cases in Panel A and Panel B, 
the results undoubtedly show that innovation differentials cause disparities in dividend payout 
for the firms in the same life cycle stage defined by Dickinson(2011) cash flow patterns. 
Table 8-Likelihood of Paying Dividend due to Different Degree of Innovation for the Same 
Cashflow Patterns Group (Based on the Life Cycle Stages of Dickinson,2011) 
 
In Table 9, I present the of logit regression result performed on the firms of the same ‘cashflow pattern’ group (based on 
Dickinson,2011) but with different degrees of innovation. I follow Fama-French(2001) to model the logit regression.  The 
dependent variable is the binary variable ‘dividend payer’(equals one if payer, 0 otherwise).  The main independent variable is 
the innovation index. I control for firm age, retained earnings, roa, capxratio, and sales ratio. Specification 1 is the result of the 
below-median R&D sample; specification 2 is from the above-median R&D sample; specification 3 is from the persistent 
innovators.  The last column is the result of the full sample. Panel A reports the logit regression result for the mature stage as 
defined by cashflow patterns. Panel B reports the result for the Shakeout stage as defined by the cashflow patterns. The sample 
consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. 










 divpayer divpayer divpayer divpayer 
     
CitWtedIndex 3.598 -6.31*** -17.04** -9.202** 
 (0.28) (-4.13) (-3.12) (-3.06) 
     
lnage 7.371** 2.044*** 1.893*** 2.017*** 
 (2.62) (3.94) (10.07) (11.70) 
     
reteratio 4.669 2.850*** 1.483*** 1.596*** 
 (1.73) (4.30) (7.32) (8.26) 
     
lnebitdaratio 0.946 0.293 -0.108 0.140 
 (0.86) (0.88) (-0.61) (1.03) 
     
lnsaleratio 0.844 -0.641 0.832*** 0.487** 
 (0.40) (-1.28) (3.76) (2.60) 
     
lnlvrgratio -0.325 -0.0806 -0.283*** -0.211*** 
 (-1.56) (-0.98) (-6.89) (-6.27) 
     
lncapxratio -1.271 1.179*** 0.259* 0.263** 
 (-1.65) (3.74) (2.29) (2.65) 
     
_cons -34.40** -3.629 -8.473*** -7.937*** 











t statistics in parentheses 

















 divpayer divpayer divpayer divpayer 
     
CitWtedIndex -5.655 -19.19 -2.594** -3.871*** 
 (-1.89) (-1.95) (-3.07) (-4.25) 
     
lnage 1.849* -0.305 2.668*** 2.298*** 
 (2.19) (-0.14) (7.24) (7.45) 
     
reteratio 3.772** 4.339 1.700*** 2.276*** 
 (3.28) (1.42) (4.10) (6.02) 
     
lnebitdaratio 0.118 -0.561 0.218 0.0284 
 (0.21) (-0.29) (0.78) (0.12) 
     
lnsaleratio 0.594 -3.468 0.452 0.286 
 (0.65) (-1.33) (1.30) (0.94) 
     
lnlvrgratio -0.230 -0.300 -0.0344 -0.0724 
 (-1.46) (-1.11) (-0.52) (-1.32) 
     
lncapxratio -0.00974 -0.422 0.0638 0.0293 
 (-0.03) (-0.51) (0.40) (0.21) 
     
_cons -10.29** -5.529 -9.211*** -9.279*** 











t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
All the variables in empirical models in sections 2, 3, and 4 are normalized by dividing with 
the total asset except for RETE in which case I normalize retained earnings with total equity. I 
follow the existing literature Fama-French(2001), Deangelo (2006), Dickinson(2011), and Faff et 
al. (2016) to identify the control variables. I do not report statistically insignificant control 
variables. The dividend amount equations 2, 4, and 5 are estimated using cross-sectional ordinary 
least squares with standard errors clustered by firms27. The payer specification in equation 3, 7, 
8, 9, 10, and 11 are estimated using the logistic regression. 
 





5.2.4.2 Life Cycle Defined by RE/TE: Same Stage but Different Degree of Innovation 
 
I test whether groups of firms (based on the degree of innovations) in the same life cycle 
stage as defined by earned contributed capital (DeAngelo,2006) have a similar propensity to pay 
dividends. I run the following cross-sectional logit regression similar to Fama-French(2001) in 
which the dependent variable is the div payer equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 
otherwise. 
Div Payer𝑡~ life cycle stage defined by re/te + InnovationIndex + control variable  -- equation 10 
I apply similar logic as in Table 9 for earned contributed capital mix re/te ratio in Table 10.  I run 
the logit model as given in equation 10 on the full sample as well as on the other three sub-
samples based on a different degree of innovation: 1. Below average innovators 2. Above-

















Table 9-Likelihood of Paying Dividend due to Different Degree of Innovation for the Same 
RETE Group (Based on DeAngelo et al.,2006) 
In Table 10, I present the of logit regression result performed on the firms of the same ‘RE/TE’ group (based on DeAngelo et 
al.,2006) but with different degrees of innovation. I follow Fama-French(2001) to model the logit regression.  The dependent 
variable is the binary variable ‘dividend payer’(equals one if payer, 0 otherwise).  The main independent variable is the innovation 
index. I control for firm age, retained earnings, roa, capxratio, and sales ratio. Specification 1 is the result from the below-median 
R&D sample; specification 2 is from the above-median R&D sample; specification 3 is from the persistent innovators.  The last 
column is the result from the full sample. Panel A reports the logit regression result for the re/te quartile two groups. Panel B 
reports the result for the re/te quartile four groups. The sample consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the duration 
is from 1973 to 2017. 
 
Panel A: RE/TE Quartile 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 divpayer divpayer divpayer divpayer 
     
CitWtedIndex -0.868 -3.890*** -5.557** -4.059*** 
 (-0.21) (-4.64) (-2.24) (-6.22) 
     
lnage 21.20* 1.835*** 1.836*** 1.949*** 
 (1.98) (3.51) (7.61) (9.19) 
     
reteratio 46.21* 3.490* 2.015** 2.490*** 
 (2.25) (2.31) (2.84) (4.05) 
     
lnebitdaratio 5.415* 0.787* 0.347 0.563*** 
 (2.02) (2.39) (1.80) (3.64) 
     
lnsaleratio -6.492 -0.260 1.188*** 0.737*** 
 (-1.72) (-0.52) (4.61) (3.52) 
     
lnlvrgratio -1.447 -0.0260 -0.286*** -0.214*** 
 (-1.81) (-0.32) (-5.90) (-5.55) 
     
_cons -99.36* -5.862** -8.406*** -7.974*** 











t statistics in parentheses 




















RETE Q3 Sample 
 divpayer divpayer divpayer divpayer 
     
CitWtedIndex -1.138 -2.167*** -2.350*** -2.015*** 
 (-1.78) (-4.25) (-6.63) (-8.81) 
     
lnage 3.406*** 2.811*** 2.442*** 2.536*** 
 (4.09) (8.27) (16.86) (19.56) 
     
reteratio 4.626*** 2.613*** 1.592*** 1.843*** 
 (4.19) (5.98) (9.73) (12.07) 
     
lnebitdaratio 1.147* 0.511** 0.289** 0.386*** 
 (2.42) (2.73) (2.73) (4.43) 
     
lnlvrgratio -0.151 -0.178*** -0.274*** -0.235*** 
 (-1.74) (-3.50) (-9.76) (-10.41) 
     
lnsaleratio -0.0316 0.155 0.660*** 0.482*** 
 (-0.05) (0.55) (4.47) (3.84) 
     
_cons -13.62*** -11.20*** -10.47*** -10.48*** 











t statistics in parentheses 




The results in Table 10 presents the dividend payout differentials among the firms in the 
same RE/TE group. Panel A shows RE/TE ‘quartile one’ firms (young firms, according to the re/te 
classification), and the data clearly shows that the persistent innovators have a stronger negative 
effect on the dividend payout even if all the three groups are in the same re/te quartile. The 
innovation impact distinction is even more apparent in Panel B that presents the RE/TE ‘quartile 
three’ firms (mature firms, according to the re/te classification). The results are consistent with 
the story that two groups of firms that are in the same life cycle phase, as defined by RETE have 






5.2.4.3 Life Cycle Defined by ‘Age’: Same Stage but Different Degree of Innovation 
 
I have extensively discussed that mainstream literature still uses firm age to proxy for the 
firm life cycle. Therefore, I also attempt to test whether groups of firms(based on the degree of 
innovations) in the same age category have a similar propensity to pay dividends. I run the 
following cross-sectional logit regression similar to Fama-French(2001) in which the dependent 
variable is the div payer equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. 
Div Payer𝑡~ age + InnovationIndex + control variable  -- equation 11 
Table 11 Panel A reports the result for the firms in the age group 25 to 30. Similarly, Panel B 
presents the result for the firms in the age group 45 to 50. The results in Table 11 include three 
sub-samples based on a different degree of innovation: a). Below average innovators, b) Above-

















Table 10-Likelihood of Paying Dividend due to Different Degree of Innovation for the Same 
Age Group 
In Table 11, I present the of logit regression result performed on the firms of the same ‘age’ group but with different degrees of 
innovation. I follow Fama-French(2001) to model the logit regression.  The dependent variable is the binary variable ‘dividend 
payer’(equals 1 if payer, 0 otherwise).  The main independent variable is the innovation index. I control for firm age, retained 
earnings, roa, capxratio, and sales ratio. Specification 1 is the result of the below-median R&D sample; specification 2 is from the 
above-median R&D sample; specification 3 is from the persistent innovators.  The last column is the result of the full sample. 
Panel A reports the logit regression result for the age group 50 to 55. Panel B reports the result for the age group 25-30. The 
sample consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. 
 











 divpayer divpayer divpayer divpayer 
     
CitWtedIndex -0.340 -2.474*** -3.072*** -2.628*** 
 (-1.19) (-4.15) (-8.74) (-12.11) 
     
lnage 4.455** 2.094** 2.253*** 2.448*** 
 (3.10) (2.99) (5.27) (7.08) 
     
lnebitdaratio 0.484* 0.764*** 0.463*** 0.542*** 
 (2.18) (5.79) (5.81) (8.65) 
     
lnlvrgratio -0.252*** -0.214*** -0.333*** -0.291*** 
 (-4.28) (-5.92) (-14.23) (-16.41) 
     
lnsaleratio 1.457*** 0.113 0.414*** 0.266** 
 (3.59) (0.63) (3.56) (2.89) 
     
_cons -18.16*** -7.928** -9.308*** -9.745*** 











t statistics in parentheses 

























 divpayer divpayer divpayer divpayer 
divpayer     
CitWtedIndex -3.955 -2.715 -26.50*** -14.88*** 
 (-1.46) (-0.17) (-9.01) (-9.71) 
     
lnage 4.161*** 27.04** 6.477*** 5.475*** 
 (4.70) (2.87) (10.11) (11.05) 
     
lnebitdaratio 0.881*** -0.377 0.598*** 0.567*** 
 (4.53) (-0.71) (5.80) (6.54) 
     
lnlvrgratio -0.298*** -0.118 -0.361*** -0.313*** 
 (-7.08) (-0.67) (-11.43) (-13.19) 
     
lnsaleratio 0.177 -3.953* 0.000383 0.0282 
 (0.73) (-2.28) (0.00) (0.21) 
     
reteratio 2.140*** 10.74** 2.317*** 2.273*** 
 (6.87) (2.92) (10.13) (12.60) 
     
_cons -17.26*** -113.2** -26.19*** -22.33*** 











t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
As shown in Table 11, firms in the same age group (Panel A 25 to 30 years) but the one 
with persistent innovations have the propensity to pay less dividends in comparison to the other 
less innovative groups.  Similarly,  Panel B, I run the regression for the firms' age 45 to 50, and I 
see the consistent patterns that persistent innovators tend to pay less dividends even if the three 








6. ROBUST TESTING  
 
In Table 3, I use sales growth as dependent variable to study the innovation impact on the 
firm growth.  In Table 12, I use five year rolling asset growth28 as a proxy for firm growth. The 
variables of interest are the life cycle proxies innovation index, RETE ratio, Cashflow ratio and 
Age. The results are consistent that innovation proxy (in this case Kogan index as innovation 
index) have statistically significant positive relationship with the asset growth. Whereas RETE and 
age has statistically significant negative relationship with the asset growth. On the other hand, 
cashflow pattern has positive relationship with the asset growth. 
Table 12 - Impact of Life Cycle Proxies on Asset Growth 
In this table, the dependent variable is the asset growth and variables of interest are the life cycle proxies such as RETE, 
CASHFLOW, AGE and INNOVATION. The control variables are the log of EBITDARATIO, SALES RATIO, and LEVERAGE RATIO. The 
sample consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 assetgrwth assetgrwth assetgrwth assetgrwth 
lnebitdaratio -0.0312 0.0704** 0.0602* 0.0993*** 
 (-0.53) (2.62) (2.15) (3.77) 
     
lvrgratio -1.320 -0.515 -0.514 -0.515 
 (-0.88) (-1.30) (-1.24) (-1.32) 
     
saleratio -1.045*** -0.734*** -0.739*** -0.654*** 
 (-12.43) (-21.64) (-20.17) (-19.00) 
     
koganindex 0.421***    
 (4.29)    
     
reteratio  -0.0118*   
  (-0.39)   
     
cashflowratio   0.308**  
   (1.56)  
     
age    -0.0194*** 
    (-13.05) 
_cons 2.216*** 2.121*** 2.073*** 2.912*** 
 (12.04) (26.21) (23.88) (29.24) 
N 24293 59351 55162 59483 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 





In Table 13, I check the impact of firm growth measured by five year rolling asset growth 
on the dividend payout. The first two specifications are from the cross-sectional OLS and the last 
two specifications are form the logit regression. The results are consistent that firm growth have 
negative relationship with the dividend payout. 
Table 13 - Impact of Asset Growth on Dividend Payout 
In this table, the variables of interest is the five year asset growth as a growth proxy and the dependent variable is the dividend 
payout.  The control variables are the log of EBITDARATIO, SALES RATIO, CAPX Ratio and LEVERAGE RATIO. Specification 1 and 
specification 2 are from the OLS regression in which the dividend ratio is the dollar value of dividend payout normalized by total 
asset. Specification 3 and 4 are the results from the cross-sectional logit regression in which dependent variable is the binary 1 
for dividend payer and 0 is for non-payer. The sample consists of Compustat US manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 
1973 to 2017. 
 (1-robust OLS) (2- robust OLS) (3-logit) (4-logit) 
 
 divratio divratio divpayer divpayer 
main     
fiveyearassetgrwthrate -0.000241*** -0.000208*** -0.125*** -0.273*** 
 (-15.42) (-12.81) (-26.72) (-30.43) 
     
lnebitdaratio  0.00777***  0.812*** 
  (61.73)  (39.64) 
     
lvrgratio  -0.0430***  -30.62*** 
  (-21.89)  (-32.77) 
     
     
     
rdratio              -0.0416***                -15.69*** 
  (-25.47)  (-55.28) 
     
capxratio            0.000184               4.730*** 
  (0.09)  (16.14) 
     
_cons            0.0122***              0.0327***             0.113***              2.804*** 
 (170.84) (78.20) (13.23) (42.88) 
N 70415 40695 70707 40780 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Finally, in Table 14, I create an interaction term of high innovation vs low innovation 
against the mature phase defined by each of the life cycle proxies. Panel A is for the maturity 
stage defined by cashflow pattern. Panel B is for the maturity stage defined by RETE and Panel C 





dependent variables.  I create two dummy variable one each for low innovation (if the firms have 
citation weighted patent less than the industry median) and high innovation (if the firms have 
citation weighted patent above the industry median). Then I create corresponding variables 
interacting with the mature phase defined by each of the life cycle proxies.  
Table 14 - Impact of ‘Maturity’ and High vs Low ‘Innovation Interaction’ on Dividend Ratio  
In this table, the variable of interest is the maturity stage defined by each of the popular life cycle proxies RETE, CASHFLOW and 
AGE. The dependent variable is the dividend payout.  The control variables are the log of ebitda ratio, sales ratio, capx ratio, free 
cashflow ratio  and the leveraged ratio. Specification 3 has the interaction term of mature phase and low innovation index 
dummy. Specification 4 has the interaction term of mature phase and high innovation index dummy. Panel A is for Cashflow 
pattern maturity stage, Panel B is for RETE maturity phase and Panel C has firm age. The sample consists of Compustat US 
manufacturing firms, and the duration is from 1973 to 2017. 
Panel A - Cashflow Pattern Maturity Stage     
  -1 -2 -3 -4 
  divratio divratio divratio divratio 
DMature 0.00699*** 0.00700*** 0.00631*** 0.00730*** 
 (51.88) (37.13) (32.26) (38.46) 
     
lnebitdaratio  0.00540*** 0.00536*** 0.00539*** 
  (40.68) (40.42) (40.67) 
     
lvrgratio  -0.0268*** -0.0259*** -0.0262*** 
  (-13.82) (-13.38) (-13.55) 
     
saleratio  -0.00160*** -0.00146*** -0.00161*** 
  (-9.48) (-8.65) (-9.54) 
     
fcfratio  0.000767** 0.000809** 0.000772** 
  (2.84) (3.00) (2.86) 
     
capxratio  0.000729 0.000457 0.00161 
  (0.35) (0.22) (0.77) 
     
DMXlowinovdum   0.00454***  
   (12.50)  
     
DMXhighinnovdum    -0.00802*** 
    (-11.71) 
     
_cons 0.00884*** 0.0210*** 0.0207*** 0.0209*** 
  (132.06) (48.07) (47.53) (47.98) 
N 92502 39016 39016 39016 
adj. R-sq 0.082 0.101 0.105 0.104 
 
 






Panel B – RETE (Maturity Phase) 
  -1 -2 -3 -4 
  divratio divratio divratio divratio 
retecat3dum 0.0142*** 0.0120*** 0.0117*** 0.0120*** 
 
(54.56) (38.65) (34.76) (38.68)      
lnebitdaratio 
 
0.00583*** 0.00583*** 0.00583*** 
  
(44.66) (44.64) (44.67)      
lvrgratio 
 
-0.0253*** -0.0253*** -0.0253*** 
  
(-13.06) (-13.07) (-13.06)      
saleratio 
 
-0.000696*** -0.000693*** -0.000696*** 
  
(-4.14) (-4.12) (-4.14) 
     
fcfratio 
 
0.00146*** 0.00146*** 0.00146*** 
  
-5.43 -5.44 -5.44 
     
capxratio 
 
-0.00113 -0.00114 -0.00112 
  
(-0.54) (-0.54) (-0.53) 





   




    
(-2.79) 
     
_cons 0.00982*** 0.0231*** 0.0231*** 0.0231*** 
  -164.76 -55.31 -55.28 -55.31 
N 92502 39016 39016 39016 
adj. R-sq 0.091 0.104 0.104 0.104 
 
Panel C - AgeCat4 (Age Maturity) 
  -1 -2 -3 -4 
  divratio divratio divratio divratio 
agecat4dum 0.0132*** 0.0135*** 0.0126*** 0.0134*** 
 
(86.56) (50.22) (44.31) (49.84)      
lnebitdaratio 
 
0.00605*** 0.00601*** 0.00604*** 
  
(47.13) (46.85) (47.08)      
lvrgratio 
 
-0.0239*** -0.0231*** -0.0235*** 
 
 (-12.48) (-12.07) 
(-12.29) 
    
saleratio 
 






(-3.78) (-3.31) (-3.89) 
     
fcfratio 
 
0.00146*** 0.00146*** 0.00146*** 
  
(5.51) (5.52) (5.50)      
capxratio 
 
-0.00686*** -0.00676** -0.00578** 
  
(-3.33) (-3.28) (-2.80) 





   
(8.66) 
 
     
ageXhighinnovdum 
   
-0.000113*** 
    
(-9.66) 
     
_cons 0.00838*** 0.0232*** 0.0228*** 0.0234*** 
  -134.84 -56.76 -55.53 -57.11 
N 92502 39016 39016 39016 
adj. R-sq 0.075 0.126 0.127 0.128 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In Table 14, Panel A shows that higher innovation interaction with the mature phase 
(defined by cashflow) have negative impact on the dividend payout ratio whereas less innovation 
interaction with the mature phase (defined by cashflow)  have a positive impact on the dividend 
payout ratio. Similarly, Panel B shows that higher innovation interaction with the mature phase 
(defined by RETE) have negative impact on the dividend payout ratio whereas less innovation 
interaction with the mature phase (defined by RETE)  have a positive impact on the dividend 
payout ratio. Likewise, Panel C shows that higher innovation interaction with the mature phase 
(defined by age) have negative impact on the dividend payout ratio whereas less innovation 
interaction with the mature phase (defined by age)  have a positive impact on the dividend 
payout ratio. In all the Panels, both positive and negative relations of lower innovation vs higher 
innovation are statistically significant at 0.1% level. Thus, we have a strong evidence that there is 
a clear difference in dividend payout even if the firms are in the ‘same life cycle stage’ defined by 








I provide sufficient evidence that the existing firm life cycle proxies failed to capture the 
innovation impact differentials on the dividend life cycle stages. I prove that among the two 
groups of firms, one with the higher innovation pays lower dividends in comparison to its lower 
innovative counterparts controlling for the firm characteristics such as age, size, profitability, 
growth opportunity, re/te, and the cashflow patterns. The last proxy in the life cycle literature is 
Faff et al. (2016) MLDA measure, which is the function of age, RE/TE, profit(EBIT/asset), and 
sales). It is highly likely that this proxy also suffers from the weakness as it does not account for 
the innovation intensity impact in its measurement. However, I left this part for future research. 
I believe that I present comprehensive research on the dividend life cycle and how it is 
impacted due to the degree of innovation. I establish a positive relationship between 
innovativeness and firm growth. Likewise, I examine whether the maturity hypothesis holds 
regardless of the firm life cycle proxies used. I then investigate the relationship between the 
dividend payout (as a firm’s maturity characteristic ), and the degree of innovativeness.  I 
document that the more persistent the firm innovation, the stronger the negative relationship 
between the innovativeness and the dividend payout. Finally, I empirically highlight the 
shortcomings of the existing life cycle proxies that they are not fully capturing the firm 
characteristics, especially, the impact of innovation output while defining the life cycle stages. 
Further, I study retained earnings ratio and the cash flow patterns to determine whether 
and, if so, how the life cycle of a firm affects its dividend policy. Based on the evidence presented, 
I argue that innovation intensity is the most effective measure to estimate the dividend life cycle. 
While I have provided sufficient empirical evidence (with multiple robustness checks) on the 
superiority of innovation intensity as a life cycle proxy to measure the maturity of a firm, there is 
a certain limitation that demands further exploration. For example, the approximate cut-off line 
between the life cycle stages will need to be determined based on the degree of innovation, firm 
growth rate, and the dividend payout of a firm. I conclude that while none of the life cycle proxies 





determines the firm life cycle, and surprisingly, the innovation characteristics of the firm are not 
sufficiently examined in the life cycle literature. I claim that this study contributes to the literature 
by attempting to fill the void.  Perhaps, based on this fact, I can also claim that innovation 
intensity stands better among all the life cycle proxies available on this line of literature. I provide 
convincing evidence that citation backed innovation output better captures the cross-sectional 
variability of the dividend payout during the firm maturity regardless of the life cycle proxies 
used. 
The final sequence in the empirical study is to examine whether firm innovation is the 
result of good corporate governance.  This notion has been sufficiently tested and has supporting 
evidence in the existing studies. I can still verify that the persistent innovators in the 
manufacturing sample have good corporate governance. I left this part also for future research 
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Appendix A (Chapter 1) 
 




Name Variable Formula Comments 
Dividend Ratio divratio  div/at   
R&D Ratio rdratio  xrd/at   
Lag R&D Intensity lagRDint  xrd/lagsale   





Citation Weighted Innovation Index tcw    I use Kogan et 
al.(2017) model 
  
Kogan Index tcw + tsm Following Kogan, I use 
also the combination of 
citation weighted and 




Growth growth   lnsale - lnlagsale   
Return on Equity Ratio roeratio  roe/at   
Return on Asset Roaratio ni/at   
EBITDA Ratio ebitdaratio   ebitda/at   
SALE Ratio saleratio  sale/at   
Retained earnings to total equity reteratio  re/te   
Retained earnings to total asset retaratio   re/at   
Leverage Ratio lvrgratioratio  lvrg/at   
CAPX Ratio capxratioratio  capx/at   
Size size  log(at)   
Total Equity totequity  te   
Free Cash Flow fcf   oancf - xidoc + intpn - 
((pi-ni)/pi)*xint - capx 
  
Firm Age age current year - linkeddt   




Chapter 1 Appendix Table B – Compustat  Derived Variables References 
Variable Formula Variable Name 
 eps ni/csho Earnings per share 
 epsratio   eps/at Earnings per share to total asset 
divratio dvc/at Dividends Common/Ordinary 
 rdratio   xrd/at R&D to total asset 
 payoutratio 
 
(dvp+dvc+prstkc)/ib Payout ratio as defined by compustat 
 capxratio   capx/at CAPEX to total asset 





 roe ni/(csho*prcc_f) Return on Equity 
 be   prcc_c * csho Book Equity Value 
 mv   csho*prcc_f Market Value 
 markettobook   mkvalt/bkvlps Market to Book Value 
 cashflowratio   (ibc + dp)/at Cashflow  
 cashholdingratio che/at Cash holding 
 costofcapital xint/dlc Cost of Capital 
 lvrg  (dltt+dlc)/seq Leverage 
 lvrgratio   lvrg/at Leverage Ratio 
 tangibleassetratio   ppent/at Tangible Assets 
 tobinsq (at + (csho*prcc_f)-ceq)/at Tobin’s Q 
 totalequity pstkc+csho Total Equity 
freecashflow   oancf - xidoc + intpn - ((pi-ni)/pi)*xint - capx Free Cash Flow 
 totalequity pstkc+csho Total Equity 
retainedearningstotatalequity re/te Retained earnings to total equity 
retainedearningstotatalasset re/ta Retained earnings to total asset 
totalequitytototalasset te/ta Total equity to total asset 
cashflowtototalasset cash/ta Cash to total asset 
am Amortization of Intangible Assets Amortization of Intangible Assets includes 
trademark, patents, copyright, etc.. 
 
 
Chapter 1 Appendix Table C - Dickinson (2011) Life Cycle Stages Based on Cashflow Patterns 
Cash Flow Introductory Growth Maturity Shakeout Shakeout Shakeout Decline Decline 
Operating  - + + - + + - - 
Investing - - - - + + + + 
Financing + + - - + - + - 
 














SCALE EFFECTS ON ETFS PERFORMANCE 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
According to Zhu (2018) “if the nature of the returns to scale is not constant, fund size is 
informative”. The paper claims that the unobserved skill is reflected in two observable measures: 
return and size. It goes on saying that the traditional framework that studies managerial skill and 
ignores size fails to fully utilize the available information. So, the paper implies that if the returns 
to scale is constant, then size doesn’t matter; otherwise, it does. Now, the question is - does 
index-tracking funds such as ETFs exhibit managerial portfolio selection skill? And according to 
Crane et al. (2018), the answer is ‘surprisingly yes’. The paper applies methods designed to 
measure mutual fund skill to a cross-section of index funds that is unlikely to exhibit managerial 
portfolio selection skill and find that the index tracking fund does exhibit skill that is persistent 
and is in similar proportion as in active funds. Therefore, a critical question arises, does ETFs have 
constant returns to scale?29 or do they have either increasing or decreasing returns to scale?30 
Zhu(2018) findings suggest that if ETFs follow increasing or diminishing returns to scale, then size 
does matter, so it demands investigation.  
The motivation also comes from the conflicting findings in the extant literature for the 
size effect on fund performance. One side of the argument suggests that size does erode fund 
performance due to diseconomies of scale ( see Chen et al. , 2004; Yan, 2008) whereas the other 
side implies that fund size has no relation to the fund performance ( see  Phillips et al., 2018; 
Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2015; Reuter and Zitzewitz, 2015). Consistent with Chen et al. 
 
29 Evidence of constant returns to scale include Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec (2007), Elton, Gruber and Blake (2012), 
Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2013), Reuter and Zitzewitz (2015), Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015)  
and Phillips, Pukthuanthong, and Rau (2016).   
30Evidence supporting diseconomies of scale at the fund level include Yan (2008), Busse, Jiang, and Tang (2014), 






and Yan(2008), Zhu (2018) and Pastor et al. (2019) also document stronger evidence of 
decreasing returns to scale. However, older papers such as Grinbalt and Titman (1989) find mixed 
evidence that fund returns decline with fund size. Further, Berk and Green (2004) conclude that 
there should be no significant relation between fund size and performance in the cross-section. 
Unlike all these papers, Indro et al. (1999) find a nonlinear relation between fund size and 
performance. They observe that performance initially increases and then decreases in fund size. 
These results from the conventional funds are simply perplexing.  
Now, let’s take a closure look on where the broader equity ETFs falls in the fund 
categories. SEC classifies ETFs as open-end funds31. However, by design ETFs are a hybrid asset 
fund between an open-end and a closed-end fund. They share a resemblance to an open-end 
fund because units can be created when investors buy the ETF. They share a similarity to closed-
end funds in the sense that units can be freely traded regardless of whether units are created or 
not. The hybrid structure allows for a mechanism where funds can be traded continuously during 
the trading hours, and this intraday trading feature makes the ETFs as one of the most liquid 
instruments that attract high turnover clientele, such as hedge funds and high-frequency traders 
for speculation, arbitrage, and hedging (Ben-David et al., 2018).  
Furthermore, market index-tracking ETFs is expected to capture the equity market return 
by replicating the performance of a broad capitalization-weighted market index at low fees 
compare to the traditional funds. Hence, many consider the terms passive and ETF to be 
synonyms32. However, I argue that there are multiple concerns in generalizing the ‘broader 
universe of ETFs’ as a passive investment. One concern is that continuous trading of ETFs in the 
exchanges should be of no relevance for the passive investors because investing in passive funds 
supposed to be based on buy and hold strategy for the long-term investors who need to avoid 
frequent trading. Ben-David et al. (2017) test the propositions that “the mutual funds may appeal 
to short-term investors due to the absence of commission fees, while ETFs may appeal to long-
term investors due to lower management fees”, however, they find exact opposite results and 
 
31 See https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsinwsmfhtm.html 
32 See similar discussion in Blitz, David and Vidojevic, Milan, The Performance of Exchange-Traded Funds 





document that investors in ETFs have significantly shorter horizons33. Another concern is that not 
every equity ETFs contain low costs. There are ETFs with expense ratios higher than many mutual 
funds, and there is no homogeneity in cost across the ETFs spectrum.   
Crane et al. (2018) cite Elton et al. (2004) to make a point that net-of-fee performance is 
persistent within S&P 500 funds due primarily to fee differences to which investor flows respond.  
Crane et al. paper further show not only performance differences across a wider set of index 
funds but also performance differences in terms of tracking error among funds with the same 
benchmark (e.g., S&P 500), suggesting heterogeneity within the same benchmark itself. Likewise, 
I argue if the objective of ETFs is to promote passive investing, then, in theory, few ETFs on the 
broader market should be sufficient for the investors; in reality, there are thousands of ETFs now 
competing for different ‘active investment strategies’ via custom-designed exchange-traded 
funds.  
In the sample for this study, the non-leveraged, non-inverse, non-active ‘equity only ETFs’ 
consists of one thousand fifty-one ETFs, and among those, only a few tracks the market index, 
and the majority of them track indices that are focusing on a particular sector or investment 
theme (value, growth, small-cap, large-cap, momentum, dividend, emerging markets, sector, 
etc.). According to Easley, Michayluk, O'Hara, and Putniņš (2018), ETFs have a median active 
share of 93.1% and median tracking error of 8.8%, relative to the passive market portfolio. 
Robertson (2018) further concludes that far from being passive, ETFs are a different form of 
delegated management, where the delegee is the index creator rather than the fund manager34.   
Therefore, with their hybrid structure under a different form of delegated management 
via index, I think that ETFs demand separate investigation of returns to scale behavior within its 
own merits.  Moreover, due to the lack of empirical study on ETFs performance in the existing 
literature, the risk-return superiority over mutual funds or the broader market is anecdotal at 
best. The gap in the literature is surprising, given the significant rapid growth in the number of 
 
33 See page 9-10 on Ben-David, Itzhak and Franzoni, Francesco A. and Moussawi, Rabih, Exchange Traded Funds 
(ETFs) (August 2017). Annual Review of Financial Economics, Volume 9, 2017 
34 See similar discussion in Blitz, David and Vidojevic, Milan, The Performance of Exchange-Traded Funds 





ETFs debut and the asset base size growth in recent years.  Thus, in light of massive fund inflow35 
into this relatively new financial innovation lately, it is vital to empirically find out the various 
aspects of the scale effect on the exchange-traded funds' performance, including the tracking 
error.  
 
Figure 1-Increase in ETFs Size Over the Years 
 
 
Potential Factors Behind the Rapid Growth in ETFs Size: 
 
i. Diversification at a low cost 
Risk mitigation via diversification at a low cost is one of the main incentives for ETF 
investors. Hakansson (1978) and Rubinstein (1989) first imagine the idea of trading a diversified 
basket of stocks such as exchange-traded funds. They suggest that investors should be able to 
trade a diversified asset to mitigate investment risk. They imply that traditional mutual funds are 
diversified but not tradable in the stock exchanges. Stocks are tradable but not diversified. 
Therefore, ETFs are developed as a diversified ‘stock baskets’ to trade in the exchanges. The first 
ETF (S&P500 ETF ticker ‘SPY’) debut in the US market in 1993. Since then, ETFs growth story has 
 





been phenomenal36. They have revolutionized the asset management industry by taking market 
share from traditional investment vehicles such as mutual funds and index futures (Ben-David et 
al., 2018).  
 
ii. Liquidity and Trading Flexibility 
Hill (2015) suggests ETFs provide liquid access to virtually every financial market and allow 
large and small investors to build institutional-caliber portfolios. ETFs trade on the exchanges like 
the individual stocks but seeks to replicate the performance of a particular index like an index 
mutual fund. They track a defined benchmark such as specified index, a sector of the industry, 
the stock market of a foreign country, or a specific portfolio of fixed income securities. Thus, they 
are the innovative products that put together favorable characteristics of open-ended and 
closed-ended mutual funds and present a more flexible and liquid product for larger investors37. 
Besides, high levels of transparency and the quick availability of custom-designed ETFs for the 
specific investment objectives offer additional incentives to the investors.  Likewise, ETFs have 
high tax efficiency with no material premiums or discounts to the funds' intraday net asset value 
and no fund load (entrance fees, or exit fees, like in many mutual funds).  
No doubt, these key features make the investors to warmly embrace the phenomenal 
growth of the exchange-traded funds in recent decades. However, the big question that remains 
unclear is whether these great features of ETFs are helping to create higher risk-adjusted returns 
for the investors? In other words, do ETFs beat the broader market? Likewise, do they beat the 
traditional index funds? Similarly, another aspect of interest is whether and how these features 
are impacting the tracking ability of the ETFs to their underlying indexes.   
 
 
36 see the book title "Exchange- Traded Funds and the New Dynamics of Investing." The author provides an 
extensive discussion on the history, extraordinary growth in recent years, and where it is heading as an alternative 
investment asset in the future. It mentions that the first ETF (ticker 'SPY') tracking the S&P 500 broader market 
index debut in 1993. Sector ETFs tracking the nine sectors of the S&P 500 come to the market in 1998. In the same 
year, ETFs providers introduce the first actively managed ETFs. Also, in the international market, Europe debut first 
ETF in 1998. The number of ETFs trading in the US exchanges surpassed 2000 by 2018. 
37 See broader discussion on Martin Lettau & Ananth Madhavan, 2018. "Exchange-Traded Funds 101 for 





The research focus and the summary of findings: 
The fund economies of scale offer cost reductions obtained from increasing asset base 
size growth. And with an increase in scale, costs per unit of output decrease. The fixed costs 
spread over more units of output. As a result, operational efficiency is often higher, with 
increasing scale leading to lower variable costs (Haslem,2017). I argue that if ETFs are a passive 
investment, then theoretically, they should hold increasing returns to scale38. If they are hybrid 
instruments, then there should be an existence of inefficiencies that may promote diseconomies 
of scale. Furthermore, as discussed, ETFs trade in the exchanges very frequently violating passive 
buy and hold philosophy, and they have a wide range of expense ratios. There are ETFs with a 
higher expense ratio than many mutual funds39.  
With all these analyses thus far, I attempt to investigate the ‘returns to scale behavior’ in 
connection to the broader ‘equity ETFs universe’ using the quantile regression approach. 
Primarily, I focus on three main research questions; first, do ETFs risk-adjusted-performance 
increases with the increase in size? (in other words, do ETFs hold economies of scale?). Second, 
does size matter for the tracking ability of the ETFs to their underlying index? And third, do other 
fund attributes (such as liquidity, expense ratio, number of holdings, fund age, lagged fund 
return, fund flows, and the investment styles (small-cap, large-cap, value, growth, core/blend, 
among others) promotes or worsens the size vs. performance relationship? In other words, do 
these factors play any role in returns to scale? A better understanding of these critical questions 
would naturally be useful for investors, and policymakers, especially in light of the enormous 
money inflows that have increased the mean size of ETFs in the recent past. I believe that the 
study will help address even more important question what matters most in ETFs selections from 
a performance perspective for both the retail and the institutional investors? 
In terms of methodology, Zhu(2018) criticizes existing literature that quantifies scale 
effects based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach that directly regresses fund returns 
 
38 See discussion in Adams, John C. and Hayunga, Darren K. and Mansi, Sattar, Returns to Scale in Active and 
Passive Management (December 4, 2018). Available at  SRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295799   
39 See Blitz, David and Vidojevic, Milan, The Performance of Exchange-Traded Funds (September 23, 2019). 





on lagged fund sizes. The paper raises the concern that the validity of the OLS model is based on 
the assumption that fund size is uninformative. To address the issue, I primarily use quantile 
regression to investigate the size impact on the risk-adjusted alpha and the tracking error. 
However, I perform robust testing using cross-sectional regression (using Fama McBeth(1973) 
and panel OLS with clustered standard error on ETFID) so that I can compare the results with the 
existing findings in the literature. I use a similar cross-sectional model specification as in 
Yan(2008) and Chen et al. (2004) to examine how the scale impact on ETFs performance differs 
from the conventional mutual fund’s size impact on their returns. I also investigate the 
interaction effect of various fund attributes, investment styles, and fund types on the ETF size to 
find out whether the fund attributes, investment styles, and the fund types play any role in the 
returns to scale behavior.  
The empirical findings show that ETFs, in general, do not have increasing returns to 
scale40. I find some evidence of positive returns while increasing the asset base initially; however, 
the positive returns have a distinct decreasing pattern as the size grows, and ultimately the 
positive alpha turns in to negative at the high end of the size cluster (largest quantiles). I find an 
inverse size effect i.e., size has a more substantial negative impact on the highest performing 
quantiles of the ETFs (high performing cluster). I observe that the decay in performance is steady 
as the asset base size increases. However, I find that the size impact on the tracking ability of 
ETFs to their underlying index is marginal. I observe that illiquidity and expense ratio aggravate 
the inverse relation of size and return performance, including the tracking error performance as 
well. I also notice that growth and value investment styles positively impact the size vs. 
performance relationship. Likewise, I observe that ETFs with capitalization-weighted index 
composition have a positive role, but the equal-weighted index composition has a negative 
influence on the size performance relationship.  
 The rest of the paper follows as below: a brief discussion on the related literature review 
is in section two. Section three presents the data and univariate analysis, and section four 
 
40 The results are similar to the extant literature that find evidences supporting diseconomies of scale at the fund 






presents the empirical details, including the findings of the study. Finally, section five concludes 
the paper. 
 
2 LITERATURE SURVEY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
In the index-based fund literature, Frino and Gallagher (2001,2002) imply that the index 
represents a paper portfolio that enables the instantaneous and costless implementation of a 
passive benchmark strategy. However, other papers argue that liquidity of the stock and the size 
of the fund have an essential impact on the replication technique implemented by the index-
tracking funds such as ETFs (see Keim,1999; and Frino et al.,2004). Likewise, Dellva (2001) 
perform a comparative study between the index mutual funds and the ETFs, and document that 
ETFs are relatively unattractive to retail investors dealing in small asset due to the transaction 
costs associated with trading. The paper implies that there are little or no benefits associated 
with tax-deferred, long term retirement class investors utilizing such products.  
Likewise, some studies cite demand shocks due to market volatility as one of the potential 
factors that may cause absolute price inefficiency in ETFs (Coval and Stafford 2007). As ETFs 
trades in the exchanges, the trading cost is another concern that may contribute to the 
diseconomies of scale.41 Perold and Salomon (1991) also argue that a large asset base erodes 
performance as a result of increased trading costs due to liquidity constraints and price 
movement. They imply that returns decline while wealth created increases up to a point where 
the cost of additional trading exceeds the opportunity cost of not trading.  Thus, I argue that ETFs 
are not free of inefficiencies, especially, the higher tracking error is the evidence that ETFs have 
inefficiencies that may introduce diseconomies of scale.  In the next section, I attempt to relate 









2.1 Examining Returns to Scale  
 
 According to Gao and Livingston(2008), scale economies enable the cost per unit of 
output to decrease when the asset base increases. Likewise, Latzko (2002) document that cost 
economies of scale from asset growth go to fund investors as lower expense ratios. Tufano and 
Sevick (1997) also agree with the notion that the fund expense ratio declines with the fund size. 
So, there is a general consensus that a lower expense ratio generally helps increase the funds’ 
asset base.  
Fund size represents the total amount of capital committed by the investors of the Fund. 
Chen et al. (2004) investigate the effect of size on the performance of actively managed funds for 
the years 1962–1999. They use cross-sectional variation to see whether performance depends 
on the scalability of the fund. They find that fund returns both before and after fees, and 
expenses decline with the lagged fund size. The paper explains that the association of size vs. 
fund alpha is most notable among funds that have small and illiquid stocks implying that scale 
effects are related to liquidity. Chen’s paper further argues that the lack of liquidity requires large 
funds to invest in less-than-best ideas with larger positions that decrease performance. The paper 
also mentions that the fund size may be correlated with other factors such as fund age, the 
number of holdings, investment styles, etc. that these factors can also drive the return 
performance.  
Consistent with Chen's observation, few other papers also find that size erodes fund 
performance because of diseconomies of scale due to trading costs42 related to liquidity or price 
impact (Lowenstein, 1997). Likewise, Pollet and Wilson (2008) find evidence that when funds 
become larger, they failed to diversify into new assets. They argue that instead of adequately 
diversifying, those funds just scale up their current asset allocation. They conclude that illiquidity 
makes a large fund to have to invest in non-optimal assets, thereby eroding performance. Becker 
and Vaughan (2001) also argue that as a fund grows larger, it becomes difficult to execute desired 
reallocation resulting reduction in the speed and nature of portfolio adjustment that ultimately 
 





impairs fund performance. Similarly, Chu (2009) study the impact of size on tracking error in the 
Hong Kong market and document that the magnitude of the tracking errors has a negative 
relation to the size of ETFs. Chu’s study also documents a positive relation to the expense ratios 
of the funds.   
In recent research, Zhu (2018) finds weaknesses in Pastor et al. (2015), which document 
that there is no relation between size and performance. Zhu argues that the method of Pástor et 
al. suffers misspecification bias resulting from a model restriction, which may be problematic for 
the fund size process. Unlike Pástor et al., Zhu finds evidence of diseconomies of scale at the fund 
level after correcting for the misspecification. One caveat, though, Zhu’s research includes only 
funds that fall into one of the nine size categories (small, mid, and large-capitalization stocks) and 
style (value, blend, and growth) and excluded bond, international, sector, money market, and 
other non-equity funds. However, the implications of the data restriction are unclear. Reducing 
the number of investment categories may yield a reduction in potential misclassifications, but it 
may also compromise the robustness of the results. Nevertheless, Pastor et al. (2019) discover 
additional evidence of decreasing returns to scale and support Zhu’s findings.  
To sum up, first, there is no broad consensus on the size impact on fund performance 
based on the conventional funds’ researches, and second, when it comes to ETFs, there is not 
even an economically meaningful empirical research available yet in the literature. Therefore, I 
argue that the research has a unique contribution to the literature that I provide a broader 
perspective on ‘the returns to scale behavior’ based on the evidence from the ‘large universe of 
equity exchange-traded funds’. 
 
 2.2 The role of ‘other’ investment factors on the size vs. performance relationship  
 
Yan (2008) reconfirmed previous findings from Chen et al.'s (2004) that performance 
declines with fund size, and fund liquidity plays a mediating role in size vs. return relationship. 
The study also observes that it is both the fund size and the liquidity that is combinedly 





the factors contributing to the diseconomies of scale. Pastor et al. (2018) find that funds with a 
larger size, lower expense ratio, and higher turnover hold more-liquid portfolios. Their findings 
also show that better-diversified funds hold less-liquid stocks. They study tradeoffs among active 
mutual funds' characteristics and confirm model-predicted tradeoffs that larger funds are 
relatively cheaper. Nevertheless, based on their new measure of activeness, larger and less 
expensive funds are not active compare to the small funds.  
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2012) propose that the decrease in expense ratio can offset the 
diseconomies of scale of the large funds. They state that fund size has no impact on future fund 
performance. Rompotis (2012) study the impact of expense ratio on the ETFs tracking error and 
finds no statistically significant relationship between tracking error and the expense ratio. The 
paper argues that since the expense ratios for the ETFs do not change that often (and sometimes 
not at all) during the data period investigated, there may not be a statistically significant 
relationship between tracking error and the expense ratio. The expense ratio can be omitted for 
several ETFs because of collinearity. 
Similarly, other researches such as Pastor et al. (2018); Carhart (1997); Elton, Gruber & 
Blake (2012) have shown that expense ratio declines with size and decline with success, with the 
top-performing funds decreasing fees and the poor performing funds increasing fees. Yan (2008) 
cites Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1997) to make an argument 
that investment style can provide additional insight into the nature of economies of scale in fund 
management. The paper document that the adverse effect of scale on performance is more 
pronounced among low book to market, i.e., growth funds. Further, Chen et al. (2004) use cross-
sectional variation to see whether performance depends on lagged fund size. They find an inverse 
relationship between the lagged asset base and the risk-adjusted returns. Thus, many ‘other’ 
funds attribute, as highlighted in this paragraph, may also play a mediating role in the scale vs. 
performance relationship that needs empirical investigation.  
2.3 Hypothesis Development   
 
Theoretically, when a fund performs well every year, the money inflows grows, the size 





other investment factors that include the importance of the liquidity, number of holdings, age, 
and various investment styles on size vs. performance relation. The scale is also often associated 
with the lagged fund flow, lagged fund return, and the lagged fund size. Lower expense ratios 
and higher liquidity drive the inflows and which in turn help determine the persistence of 
performance that is expected to increase the asset base. Similarly, as ETFs holdings are 
transparent, the lower information asymmetry helps mitigate the investment risks and 
contributes to the decrease in cost that helps increase in fund inflows. However, what is unknown 
is how the increase in scale affects ETFs risk-adjusted return performance. Besides, scale impact 
on the tracking ability of the ETFs with their benchmark while increasing their asset base growth 
is also another critical aspect of empirical investigation.  
As discussed earlier, we cannot rule out the diseconomies of scale in ETFs because of its 
hybrid nature and varying degree of activeness among the broader equity ETFs universe. The 
fund companies custom design ETFs to achieve specific investment objectives, including active 
strategies. Besides, ETFs trade heavily in the exchanges violating the passive strategy of buy and 
hold. The heavy intraday trading may also introduce other inefficiencies due to demand shocks 
and market volatilities. Furthermore, some industry practitioners often cite low expense ratios 
as the reason to invest in ETFs; however, if that is true, I argue that it is not in alignment with the 
economic theory that often said, ‘you get what you pay for.’ 
Therefore, based on all these analyses thus far and based on the literature survey, I 
examine the increasing returns to scale hypothesis focusing on non-active, non-inverse, and non-
leveraged equity ETFs. I test whether the scale has a positive impact on ETFs performance in 
terms of risk-adjusted return as well as in terms of tracking error. I subdivide the full sample into 
four size quantiles and then examine the performance differential in those quantiles.  Further, I 
use quantile regression to see the size impact on the lowest-performing funds vs. the highest 
performing funds. In addition, I analyze the pattern by examining the size effect on the 10th, 25th, 
50th, 75th, and 90th percentile of the performance metrics. Finally, to investigate the reasons why 





various investment factors that potentially play a mediating role43 and drives the relationship 
between the scale economies and ETFs performance.  
 
3 DATA AND THE UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
I examine the US-listed ETFs because the US ETF industry is relatively matured in 
comparison to the financial markets in other countries. The primary source of time-series data is 
the Thomson Reuters DataStream database, and some of the cross-sectional variables are from 
the Morningstar and ETFDB.COM44. The data sample period is from 2009 through 2018 (10 years). 
The total number of ETFs in the sample is 1051. I use the monthly time series data for the ETFs 
that have inception dates from 1993 through 2015. I exclude ETFs created after 2015 to ensure 
that I have three years of minimum data. I exclude bonds, currency, commodities, inverse, 
leveraged, and volatility ETFs. I include only non-leveraged equities ETFs that trade in the US 
stock exchanges. Further, I exclude ETFs that are marked as ‘active.’ The variables list is shown in 
the variable selection table (see in the appendix). Edwin J. Elton et al. (2001) suggests that it is 
not a good idea to make inferences based on the performance of small funds due to a potential 
upward bias in the reported returns among the observations consisting of small funds. This bias 
is problematic for the analysis in this study as well because the focus of the research is the 
relationship between scale economy and performance. Therefore, I exclude ETFs with less than 
$15 million in total net assets.  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the ETF sample. TNA is the total net assets (in 
millions). The expense ratio is the total annual management fees and expenses divided by year-
end TNA. Liquidity is proxied from normalized bid-ask price spread45.  Flow is the percentage of 
new fund flow into the Exchange Traded Fund over the period under investigation. Age is the 
 
43 See earlier discussion in literature review, Chen et al(2004) and Yan(2008) among others highlights how other 
factors such as fund attributes like liquidity, and investment styles can worsen or promotes size performance 
relationship. 
44 Please, see the variable selection table in the appendix. 
45 I follow Hameed et al(2010) to create normalized bid-ask spread.  





number of years since the inception of the ETF. The number of holdings is the number of stocks 
in an ETF. NAV is the net asset value. Volume Turn Over is the total trade transactions that 
occurred in a month. Historical volatility is the five-year standard deviation of the asset return. 
Premium/Discount is the difference between the NAV and the current market value of the ETFs. 
Lagged variables indicated are the previous time period value for the respective variables. Net 




























Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the ETF sample, excluding ‘active ETFs’. TNA is the total net assets under management 
in millions of dollars. Expense Ratio is the total annual management fees and expenses divided by year-end TNA. Liquidity is 
proxied from normalized bid-ask price spread.  Flow is the percentage of new fund flow into the Exchange Traded Fund over 
period under investigation. Age is the number of years since the establishment of the ETF. The number of Holdings is the number 
of stocks in an ETF. NAV is the net asset value. Volume Turn Over is the total trade transactions that occurred in a month. 
Historical Volatility is the five-year standard deviation of the asset return. Premium/Discount is the difference between the NAV 
and the current market value of the ETFs. Lagged variables indicated are the previous time period value for the respective 
variables. Net Asset Return is the monthly ETF return after the expense ratio. The ETF sample is from January 2009 to December 
2018. I include non-leveraged equity ETFs with TNA more than $15 million. I sort the total net assets and create the size quintiles. 
In the table, the left side provides the summary statistics of the full sample, and the right side provides the descriptive statistics 
of the size quantiles.  
  
Summary Statistics Descriptive Statistics by Size (lnTNA) Quantiles 








TNA 87135 2085.474 8759.851 264.5 15 306670.6 43.57181 157.7836 536.0237 7604.821 
LogTNA 87135 5.776646 1.786539 5.57784 2.70805 12.63353 3.664858 5.008457 6.212919 8.220756 
AGE 87004 12 4 13 3 27 10 11 12 15 
No.Holdings 86346 334 651 101 0 8572 199 246 323 562 
TradVol 87135 26134.48 179131.8 1290 0 8979386 429.9184 1478.634 6700.485 95932.71 
Expratio 86346 0.442309 0.374474 0.42 0.03 9.62 0.5311368 0.4931522 0.4389424 0.3083885 
Norm.BASpread 76325 0.006443 0.075306 0.00098 -0.0022 1.980101 0.0098389 0.0077896 0.0056212 0.0026229 
HistVol 87135 0.19385 0.10435 0.1762 0 1.1737 0.2000133 0.1999479 0.1949981 0.1804412 
NAV 54478 51.01998 36.39026 39.8174 1.1867 372.53 34.84094 44.09509 52.3524 69.83654 
NOSH 87135 35220 104541 6550 50 1696702 1645 4870 14267 120102 
PremDisc 54478 0.513868 3.913892 0.0065 -44.78 65.8259 0.1353033 0.4146493 0.8679351 0.6009388 
VIX 87135 17.39478 6.41507 15.73 9.51 46.35 17.73408 17.61208 17.27957 16.95334 














LagFlow 84666 0.398181 48.15397 0 -0.9996 12805 0.330296 0.5577195 0.6709446 0.0307266 
 
 
The mean size for the overall sample is $2085 million. The smallest ETF has a value of $15 
million, and the largest ETF has a value of $306670 million. The average age of all sample funds 
is 12 years. The average number of stocks in an ETF is 334. The average monthly trading volume 
is 26134 transactions. The mean expense ratio of the sample ETFs is 0.44%.  I calculate the 





price plus bid price46. The average normalized spread is 0.6%. Likewise, the historical volatility is 
19%. The average number of shares outstanding in the sample ETFs is 35220.  The average CAPM 
alpha is negative 0.5%, and the average net excess return is negative 0.3%. The average lagged 
fund flow is 39%.  
I sort the total net assets and create the size quantiles. In Table 1, the left side provides 
the summary statistics of the full sample, and the right side provides the descriptive statistics of 
the size quantiles.  The summary statistics report the number of observations, the monthly time-
series cross-sectional mean, the standard deviations, median, minimum, and maximum value for 
the full ETFs sample. The descriptive statistics on the right side provide mean values comparison 
by size quantiles. I create size quantiles (smallest to largest) sorted by the total net asset. As 
observed from Table 1 under descriptive statistics, size represented by total net asset is in 
increasing order. The mean size for quantile 1 is $43 million, for quantile 2 is $157million, for 
quantile 3 is $536 million, and quantile 4 is $7604 million.  Under the descriptive statistics, as the 
size increases, the bid-ask spread shows decreasing. This pattern is consistent with Chordia et al. 
(2001) and Jones(2002) that documents that bid-ask spreads of US equities decline substantially 
over the past decade. The same is the case for expense ratio, historical volatility, and the CAPM 
alpha. On the other hand, while size increases, the trading volume, net asset value (NAV), age, 
the number of holdings, the number of shares outstanding, and the premium or discount are 
increasing.  I do not see a consistent pattern for historical volatility. The variables of interest are 
reported in the appendix table ‘Variable Selection.’ 
The subsequent univariate analysis is to examine the correlation matrix. Table 2 reports 
the correlation matrix among the fund attributes and the lagged asset returns. I take cross-
sectional correlations on monthly data and report the time-series averages of the cross-sectional 
correlations.  
 





Table 2 - Correlation Matrix 
Table 2 present the correlation matrix of the variables of interests TNA is the total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense Ratio is the total annual management fees 
and expenses divided by year-end TNA. Liquidity is proxied from normalized bid-ask price spread.  Flow is the percentage of new fund flow into the Exchange Traded Fund over period 
under investigation. Age is the number of years since the establishment of the ETF. The number of Holdings is the number of stocks in an ETF. NAV is the net asset value. Volume Turn Over 
is the total trade transactions that occurred in a month. Historical Volatility is the five-year standard deviation of the asset return. Premium/Discount is the difference of the NAV and the 
current market value of the ETFs. Lagged variables indicated are the previous time period value for the respective variables. Gross excess return is the asset return minus risk free rate 
before expense ratio, and the Net Asset Return is the monthly ETF return after expense ratio. The ETF sample is from January 2009 to December 2018. I include non-leveraged equity only 
ETFs with TNA more than $15 million.   
 
 
  TNA LogTNA Expratio AGE TradVol NHoldings HistVol NBASpread NAV NetExcRet alpha_capmp lagRet LagFlow 
TNA 1             
LogTNA 0.5097 1            
Expratio -0.1372 -0.2502 1           
AGE 0.2746 0.4713 -0.1247 1          
TradVol 0.5749 0.3437 -0.037 0.2406 1         
NHoldings 0.1569 0.2643 -0.2101 0.012 0.0495 1        
HistVol -0.0473 -0.1036 0.1423 0.1761 0.1006 -0.1777 1       
NBASpread -0.0239 -0.0802 0.0329 -0.0401 -0.0181 -0.0165 0.0331 1      
NAV 0.3534 0.4178 -0.2506 0.367 0.084 0.1288 -0.1524 -0.0502 1     
NetExcRet -0.0153 -0.0016 -0.0755 0.1015 -0.0043 0.0248 0.1147 -0.0142 -0.0096 1    
Alpha_capmp 0.0826 0.2459 -0.2983 0.3923 0.032 0.0793 0.0385 -0.0428 0.2363 0.5211 1   
LagRet 0.009 0.0129 -0.0092 0.0108 -0.0062 0.0014 -0.0039 -0.0076 0.0211 0.3155 0.0294 1  






As observed in the table, TNA and log(TNA) have similar relationships with other variables. The 
expense ratio, historical volatility, normalized bid-ask spread, net excess return, and the lagged 
fund flow have a negative relation with the size. On the other hand, age, trading volume, number 
of holdings, NAV, CAPM alpha, and lagged gross return have a positive relationship with the size. 
Similarly, the normalized bid-ask spread has an inverse relation with turnover, the number of 
holdings, and it has a direct relation with expense ratio, nav, age, historical volatility, and asset 
return. Likewise, expense ratio has a positive relation with fund flow and historical volatility, and 




Zhu (2018) suggests that the natural log of FUNDSIZE is a better measure to study the 
scale effect because of severe (positive) skewness in dollar FUNDSIZE. As such, I use the log of 
the total net asset (logTNA) as a proxy for the ETF size. Following a similar line of literature, 
including Zhu’s paper, the base model is as shown below : 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎  = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡) +  u𝑖,𝑡 
 
As the paper explains, this model allows for 𝛽 = 0, which is constant returns to scale, and 
𝛽 > 0, which is economies of scale. The paper argues that these two situations are theoretically 
unrealistic because a non-negative 𝛽  implies that a fund’s investment strategy is infinitely 
scalable. According to the paper, a large fund would become the market and hence a zero-gross 
alpha. Likewise,  𝛽 < 0 is considered a diminishing return to scale. In the model, the dependent 
variable is the risk-adjusted return, and the independent variable is the ETF size proxied by the 
log of the total net asset. The term u𝑖,𝑡 represents the unobserved variable and the error term 






Chen et al. (2004) explain that the fixed-effect approach is subject to a regression to the 
‘mean bias.’ The paper caution that a fund with a year or two of lucky performance will 
experience an increase in fund size, but performance regress to the mean, will lead to a spurious 
conclusion that an increase in fund size is related to a decrease in fund returns. The paper claims 
that measuring the effect of fund size on performance using cross-sectional regressions is less 
subject to such bias. Therefore, I chose quantile and the cross-sectional regression for empirical 
research. I adopt two main approaches based on the extant literature: first, as a preliminary 
analysis, I use a cross-sectional regression approach, and then I use a quantile regression 
approach to investigate the scale effect in a more detailed setting. I use quantile regression to 
study the scale impact on the tracking error as well.  
 
Study 1: Scale Effect on ETFs Performance  - Cross-Sectional Regression Approach   
 
In this approach, the purpose is to analyze the performance of ETF securities through the 
lens of the expected return theory, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Factor-
Based Asset Pricing model. The factor values and the risk-free rate are from the Fama French 
website. Asset Return is the monthly ETF return. I calculate the excess return as asset return 
minus the risk-free rate.  
 
There are two steps involved in the process. First, I run the factor regressions, as shown 
in equations one and two below:  
 
CAPM:  𝑅𝑖 - 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 (𝑅𝑚 - 𝑅𝑓)  + ɛ𝑖       --- (1) 
4-Factor Carhart: 𝑅𝑖 - 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 (𝑅𝑚 - 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖 SMB + ℎ𝑖  HML + 𝑤𝑖 WML + ɛ𝑖  --- (2) 
Where: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛,      𝑅𝑓 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 30 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒 
 
Then I save the estimated constant of the above regression generating the rolling estimated monthly 
alpha distributions for each ETF in the dataset.   Once I have the alpha distribution for each fund, I then 





equation 2 above as dependent variables, and the log of the total net asset as the leading independent 
variables. I add control variables in accordance with the related existing literature. 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎  = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡(𝑋𝑖,𝑡)+ ɛ𝑖,𝑡, where, 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + ɛ𝑖  --- (3) 
 
I run the regression on each of the ETFs size quantiles and present the results of equation 3 in 
Table 3. The Table provides information on how the performance benchmarks compare when 
the ETFs asset growth increases. If the alpha coefficient is positive, the expected excess return 
























Table 3 - Scale Effect on ETFs Performance (A Cross-sectional Approach) 
Table 3 shows the cross-sectional regression estimates of the risk-adjusted alpha regressed on ETF size measured by total net 
asset size (logTNA). I use OLS regression (with clustered standard errors on ETFID) and Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional 
regression. TNA is the total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense Ratio is the total annual management 
fees and expenses divided by year-end TNA. Liquidity is proxied from normalized bid-ask price spread.  Flow is the percentage 
of new fund flow into the Exchange Traded Fund over the period under investigation. Age is the number of years since the 
establishment of the ETF. The number of Holdings is the number of stocks in an ETF. NAV is the net asset value. Volume Turn 
Over is the total trade transactions that occurred in a month. Historical Volatility is the five-year standard deviation of the asset 
return. Premium/Discount is the difference of the NAV and the current market value of the ETFs. Lagged variables indicated are 
the previous time period value for the respective variables. Net Excess Return is the monthly ETF return after the expense ratio. 
The ETF sample is from January 2009 to December 2018. I include non-leveraged equity, only ETFs with TNA more than $15 
million. The dependent variables are risk-adjusted alpha (CAPM and Carhart four-factor). The main independent variable is the 
size of the asset under management measured by log( TNA), and control variables are Expense Ratio, Fund Age, Liquidity,  
Trading Volume Turnover, Number of Holdings, Historical Volatility, Lagged Excess Return, and the  Lagged Fund Flow. Each 
regression in Panel A and Panel B is run on four size quantiles. Panel A is from the Fama-McBeth regression. Panel B is the result 
of the OLS regression.  The first four columns are for CAPM Alpha, and the second four columns are for Carhart Four Factor 
Alpha. In both cases, the log of total net asset is the proxy for fund size and is the main independent variable. I control for 
different investment styles and fund types dummies, as shown in the table. 
 
Table 3 Panel A  :  Fama McBeth(1973) Cross-Sectional Regression by Size Quantiles 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








LogTNA 0.656*** 0.274*** 0.211*** -0.0333 0.570*** 0.293*** 0.192*** 0.00843 
 (5.56) (4.73) (6.28) (-1.11) (4.89) (5.02) (6.63) (0.37) 
         
Expratio -0.871*** -1.049*** -1.085*** -0.536*** -0.972*** -1.202*** -1.194*** -0.552*** 
 (-6.91) (-29.42) (-21.06) (-7.11) (-9.61) (-20.66) (-23.37) (-7.20) 
         
AGE 0.200*** 0.0897** 0.0537* 0.0530*** 0.171*** 0.0787** 0.0567* 0.0516*** 
 (4.54) (3.08) (2.30) (6.70) (3.85) (2.95) (2.65) (8.64) 
         
LogTVOL -0.178*** -0.147*** -0.112*** -0.0804*** -0.183*** -0.151*** -0.112*** -0.0830*** 
 (-5.39) (-5.83) (-6.75) (-6.23) (-4.75) (-5.80) (-7.69) (-6.22) 
         





 (-1.11) (-12.56) (-2.17) (1.42) (-2.52) (-13.43) (-4.26) (-2.69) 
         
NBASpread -26.69*** -69.84*** -101.6*** -135.0*** -38.51*** -81.33*** -95.99*** -188.3*** 
 (-3.62) (-11.02) (-7.52) (-5.50) (-5.98) (-9.66) (-6.77) (-6.24) 
         
PremDisc -0.0870 0.0159*** -0.0272 0.00435 -0.0727 0.0224*** -0.0487 0.00510 
 (-1.16) (7.00) (-1.08) (1.44) (-0.71) (8.87) (-1.50) (1.85) 
         
LNetExRetPctg 0.0456*** 0.0309*** 0.0240*** 0.0190 0.0368*** 0.0260*** 0.0181** 0.0123* 
 (6.40) (4.30) (3.80) (1.79) (5.22) (4.01) (3.19) (2.24) 
         
HistVol -2.725*** -1.011 -1.533*** -0.273* -2.958*** -0.612 -1.743*** -0.0160 
 (-7.10) (-1.86) (-4.38) (-2.60) (-6.78) (-1.15) (-4.98) (-0.15) 
         
GrowthDum 0.204 0.867*** 1.042*** 0.328*** 0.156 0.796*** 0.977*** 0.338*** 
 (1.02) (12.51) (16.77) (6.98) (1.38) (12.38) (16.53) (7.12) 
         
ValueDum 0.717*** 0.613*** 0.764*** 0.198*** 0.790*** 0.583*** 0.747*** 0.225*** 
 (4.78) (6.95) (12.15) (6.00) (5.14) (6.61) (11.36) (6.35) 
         
CoreDum 0.395*** 0.488*** 0.740*** 0.225*** 0.362*** 0.536*** 0.771*** 0.242*** 
 (7.61) (5.33) (8.53) (6.64) (9.89) (5.66) (8.69) (6.86) 
         
IndCapWtD 0.129 -0.0585* -0.0438* -0.0418** 0.0676 -0.149*** -0.0501** -0.0373** 
 (1.64) (-2.22) (-2.53) (-3.34) (0.68) (-3.75) (-2.96) (-3.24) 
         





 (2.93) (-1.52) (8.57) (6.35) (0.94) (-4.70) (7.29) (6.41) 
         
_cons -4.189*** -1.697* -1.474* -0.0993 -3.172*** -1.497* -1.312* -0.108 
 (-4.17) (-2.60) (-2.66) (-0.74) (-3.55) (-2.40) (-2.62) (-0.81) 
N 

















t statistics in parentheses   * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Panel B:  OLS by Size Quantiles 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 AlphaCAPM AlphaCAPM AlphaCAPM AlphaCAPM AlphaCarhart AlphaCarhart Alpha_Carhart Alpha_Carhart 
LogTNA 0.488*** 0.184*** 0.205*** 0.117*** 0.375*** 0.218*** 0.166*** 0.106*** 
 (8.77) (4.55) (6.80) (12.24) (6.17) (5.23) (5.54) (10.48) 
         
Expratio -0.740*** -0.969*** -1.050*** -1.092*** -0.728*** -1.001*** -1.141*** -1.118*** 
 (-16.63) (-42.26) (-24.72) (-27.77) (-16.09) (-43.65) (-26.99) (-27.11) 
         
AGE 0.297*** 0.141*** 0.0979*** 0.0620*** 0.276*** 0.130*** 0.0979*** 0.0670*** 
 (44.38) (38.17) (33.64) (38.01) (37.70) (33.96) (34.01) (39.71) 
         
LogTVOL -0.0820*** -0.0892*** -0.0821*** -0.149*** -0.108*** -0.0895*** -0.0768*** -0.134*** 
 (-3.74) (-7.04) (-8.23) (-24.57) (-4.50) (-6.91) (-7.72) (-21.12) 
         
NHoldings 0.000314*** -0.0000958* 0.0000105 -0.0000158* 0.000105 -0.000179*** -0.0000126 -0.0000228** 
 (3.68) (-2.54) (0.47) (-2.17) (1.09) (-4.63) (-0.49) (-2.67) 
         
NBASpread -5.010* -1.586* -1.524 -1.494 -10.13*** -1.550 -1.439 -1.913* 
 (-2.54) (-2.40) (-1.82) (-1.93) (-3.31) (-1.61) (-1.77) (-2.39) 
         
lnVIX -0.661*** -0.200*** -0.220*** -0.140*** -0.675*** -0.146** -0.165*** -0.0461 
 (-7.22) (-3.78) (-4.76) (-5.20) (-6.78) (-2.66) (-3.60) (-1.63) 
         
PremDisc 0.0461*** -0.0000826 0.00476* 0.00582*** 0.0473*** 0.00711 0.00630** 0.00702*** 
 (3.91) (-0.02) (2.01) (3.99) (3.39) (1.57) (2.60) (4.28) 
         
LNetExRetPctg 0.178*** 0.129*** 0.121*** 0.0955*** 0.175*** 0.125*** 0.118*** 0.0967*** 
 (62.19) (74.42) (79.88) (106.11) (55.92) (69.77) (78.24) (102.59) 
         
LagFlow -0.00162 -0.000318 0.000109 -0.000273 0.000477 -0.000308 0.000170 -0.000279 
 (-1.10) (-0.42) (0.22) (-0.71) (0.18) (-0.41) (0.36) (-0.72) 
         
GrowthDum 0.784*** 0.782*** 0.974*** 0.598*** 0.838*** 0.737*** 0.948*** 0.665*** 
 (4.51) (10.41) (15.86) (18.79) (4.66) (9.72) (15.47) (19.28) 
         
ValueDum 0.646*** 0.425*** 0.668*** 0.363*** 0.876*** 0.450*** 0.683*** 0.456*** 
 (4.53) (6.31) (10.62) (11.15) (5.85) (6.58) (10.86) (12.98) 
         
CoreDum 0.0558 0.336*** 0.522*** 0.371*** 0.0931 0.397*** 0.569*** 0.439*** 
 (0.94) (10.49) (17.97) (20.28) (1.38) (11.35) (18.52) (19.94) 
         
IndCapWtD 0.228*** -0.0860** -0.129*** -0.0759*** 0.246*** -0.171*** -0.125*** -0.0687*** 
 (4.57) (-2.92) (-5.04) (-4.13) (4.52) (-5.63) (-4.95) (-3.66) 
         
IndEqWtD 0.123 -0.109** 0.128** 0.370*** 0.143* -0.191*** 0.103** 0.396*** 
 (1.80) (-2.85) (3.19) (12.05) (1.98) (-4.88) (2.59) (12.07) 
         
_cons -3.181*** -1.458*** -1.432*** -0.0746 -2.297*** -1.549*** -1.299*** -0.396*** 



















t statistics in parentheses 








I mainly use the regression framework proposed by Fama McBeth (1973), to study the 
impact of size on risk-adjusted fund alpha. Table 3 Panel A reports the results. I estimate a cross-
sectional regression of risk-adjusted alpha and report the average regression coefficients. I adjust 
the t-statistics for the serial correlation using the Newey-West Method. I provide evidence that 
both CAPM alpha and four-factor Carhart alpha are positively related to ETF size; however, the 
size impact shows a distinct decreasing pattern as the size quantile grows. The findings support 
the existing literature such as Yan (2008), Harvey and Liu (2017), and Zhu (2018), among others, 
that provide evidence for the diminishing returns to scale.  
As shown in Table 3, Panel A, on the largest size quantile, CAPM alpha has a negative 
relationship with the ETFs size. That means the largest ETFs have inferior performance compare 
to the risk-adjusted market return.  Panel A also reports that expense ratio, the log of trading 
volume, illiquidity (as measured by normalized bid-ask spread), and historical volatility have a 
negative relation with the risk-adjusted returns. On the other hand, age, lagged asset return, 
investment styles such as value and blend, and equal-weighted index composition have a 
statistically significant positive relationship with the size. The literature also mentions that the 
Fama McBeth approach addresses the possible issue of other fund attributes correlating with the 
fund size47.   
As robust testing, I also use the pooled panel OLS regression (both robust and clustered 
standard error on the ETF ID). I find the same results from both the regressions - robust as well 
as the clustered standard error on ETFs. I report the results of panel OLS in Panel B. The 
coefficient of interest is the ‘loading’ on fund size (log of TNA), which captures the relationship 
between fund size and the fund performance, controlling for other fund attributes.  The results 
in Panel B are comparable with the results in Panel A. In this case also, expense ratio, log of 
trading volume, illiquidity (as measured by normalized bid-ask spread), and historical volatility 
have a negative relation with the risk-adjusted returns. Likewise, age, lagged asset return, 
investment styles such as value, and blend have a statistically significant positive relationship 
with the size. The positive relation between the lagged fund return and fund risk-adjusted-
 





performance indicates that there is some persistence in fund performance. The results are 
statistically significant at 0.1% level. The decreasing effect of size on fund performance is 
consistent in both Fama McBeth as well as in OLS results.  
Chen et al. (2004) caution that there could be a problem when using a cross-sectional 
variation. The paper mentions that funds of different sizes may be in different styles. It explains 
that small funds might be more likely than large funds to pursue small stock, value stock, and 
price momentum strategies, which have been documented to generate abnormal returns. To 
address these issues, they suggest adjusting the fund performance by various benchmarks that 
can mitigate the heterogeneity in fund styles. As such, in the study, I cross-compare the 
benchmark adjusted returns using CAPM and the Carhart four-factor models. In addition, I 
control for investment style and fund style dummies in the regression. I find that the decreasing 
trend in size effect is consistent in both CAPM alpha as well as in Carhart four factor-alpha.  
 
Study 2: Scale Effect on ETFs Performance  - Quantile Regression Approach  
 
Koenker and Basset (1978) introduce quantile regression, and it has been widely used in 
the finance literature, for example,  Wang et al.(2015)48 uses QR to study the risk analysis in 
mutual funds, likewise, Chen & Huang (2011)49 investigates the relationship between fund 
governance and performance using quantile regression approach. The quantile regression is 
useful in situations where the relationship between the independent variable(s)  and the 
dependent variable changes at different levels of the dependent variable or where the 
association between the dependent and independent variables is heterogeneous. Likewise, 
quantile regression does not impose the assumptions of homogeneity and normality in the 
dependent variable, and it is effective when the dependent variable is heteroscedastic and/or 
highly skewed.  
 
48 See Wang, N-Y., Chen, S-S., Huang, C-J., & Yen, C-H., (2015). “Using Quantile Regression to Analyze Mutual Fund 
Risk and Investor Behavior of Variable Life Insurance”. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 7(1), pp.97-
106. 
49 See Chen, C. R., & Huang, Y., (2011). “Mutual Fund Governance and Performance: A Quantile Regression Analysis 





Highlighting the importance of quantile regression approach, Koenker, R. and Hallock, K. 
(2001) cites Mosteller and Tukey (1977)50  to suggest that “one can do better by computing 
several regression curves corresponding to the various percentage points of the distributions and 
get a complete picture of the data set.” Accordingly, I use the quantiles to describe the 
distribution of the dependent variable (in this case, factor risk-adjusted alphas) against the 
explanatory variables.  It is an appropriate method to study the different effects of the 
independent variable(s) on the dependent variable51. Therefore, I think that quantile regression 
is a better fit for empirical research as well because it gives a more comprehensive picture of the 
effect of the scale effect on the ETF performances.  I reference the actual quantile regression 
model from Koenker and Basset (1978) as follows52:  
The 𝜃th regression quantile, 0 < 𝜃 < 1 is defined as any solution to the minimization problem: 
Min bϵ𝑅𝐾 [∑ 𝜃|𝑦
𝑡
−  𝑥𝑡 𝑏| +  ∑ (1 − 𝜃)|𝑦𝑡 −  𝑥𝑡 𝑏|𝑡𝜖{𝑡:𝑦𝑡 > 𝑥𝑡𝑏  }
  𝑡𝜖{𝑡:𝑦𝑡 > 𝑥𝑡𝑏  } 
] 
Where  𝜃𝜖 (0,1), {𝑥𝑡 ∶ 𝑡 = 1, … … . , 𝑇} denote  sequence of (row) K-vectors of a known design matrix, and 
{𝑦𝑡 ∶ 𝑡 = 1, … … . , 𝑇} is a random sample on the regression process 𝑢𝑡 =  𝑦𝑡 −  𝑥𝑡  𝛽 .   
The classical OLS minimizes the sum of squared residuals, whereas, in the quantile 
regressions, I minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations53. According to Tchamyou et al. 
(2017) the conditional quantile of the dependent variable or 𝑦𝑡 given 𝑥𝑡 is Q𝑦 (θ/𝑥𝑡) = 
𝑥′𝑡β0  where unique slope parameters are modeled for each θ
𝑡ℎ specific quantiles.  Tchamyou et 
al. implies that this formulation is analogous to E(y/x) = 𝑥′𝑡β in the OLS slope where parameters 
are examined only at the mean of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.  
Further, I conduct a heteroscedasticity test to justify the use of quantile regression. I find 
that the Breusch-Pagan test statistic is significantly different from zero. Therefore, I have 
 
50 See page 12 in Koenker, R. and Hallock, K. (2001) Quantile Regression. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 
143-156. 
51 Note that, if the dependent variable is normally distributed, quantile regression will generate the same 
coefficient estimates at different estimates at different conditional percentiles of the dependent variable in which 
case it provides no additional information compare to classical OLS. 
52 See page 38 in Koenker and Basset (1978) 
53 See page 10 in  S. Tchamyou, Vanessa and Asongu, Simplice, Conditional Market Timing in the Mutual Fund 





heteroscedasticity in the dataset that justifies the use of quantile regression.   In section A below, 
I perform the quantile regression for the risk-adjusted alpha, and in section B, I perform the 
quantile regression for the tracking error.   
 
Section A: Scale Effect on ETFs Risk-Adjusted Performance  
 
I estimate the quantile regressions at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile to 
find the scale impact on ETFs with varying degrees of performances. The dependent variables are 
the risk-adjusted alpha that I generated using equation 1 (for CAPM alpha) and in equation 2 (for 
Carhart alpha).  I use the same model as in equation 3 for the quantile regression as well. The 


















Table 4 Scale Effect on the Risk Adjusted ETFs Performance - A Quantile Regression Approach 
Table 4 reports quantile regression results for the risk-adjusted ETFs performance as measured by CAPM alpha as in 
Panel A, and the four-factor Carhart alpha as in Panel B. The first column?(spec1) in each panel is from the OLS 
regression, and the next five columns each are the results of the quantile regression performed on 10th, 25th, 50th, 
75th, and 90th percentiles. The dependent variables are the CAPM alpha in Panel A, and the four-factor Carhart 
alpha in Panel B. The main independent variable is the ETF size. TNA is the total net assets under management in 
millions of dollars. LogTNA is the logarithm of TNA and is a proxy for ETF size. Expense Ratio is the total annual 
management fees and expenses divided by year-end TNA. Liquidity is proxied from normalized bid-ask price spread.  
Flow is the percentage of new fund flow into the Exchange Traded Fund over the period under investigation. Age is 
the number of years since the establishment of the ETF. Number of Holdings is the number of stocks in a ETF. NAV 
is the net asset value. Volume Turn Over is the total trade transactions that occurred in a month. Historical Volatility 
is the five-year standard deviation of the asset return. Lagged variables indicated are the previous time period value 
for the respective variables. This table provides information on how ETFs risk-adjusted performances (measured by 
CAPM alpha as in Panel A, four-factor Carhart alpha as in Panel B)  are impacted by the ETF size under different 
quantiles.  
 
Table 4 – Panel A {Dependent Variable - CAPM alpha ) 
 (1-OLS) (1-QReg 10th) (2-QReg 25th) (3-QReg 50th) (4-QReg 75th) (5-QReg 90th) 
 CAPM Alpha CAPM Alpha CAPM Alpha CAPM Alpha CAPM Alpha CAPM Alpha 
LogTNA 0.202*** 0.426*** 0.281*** 0.138*** 0.0288*** -0.0608*** 
 (26.14) (27.99) (35.23) (22.96) (4.87) (-6.70) 
       
Expratio -0.886*** -0.762*** -0.914*** -1.014*** -1.015*** -1.027*** 
 (-50.32) (-21.89) (-50.22) (-73.96) (-75.09) (-49.56) 
       
AGE 0.120*** 0.149*** 0.114*** 0.0751*** 0.0426*** 0.00917*** 
 (66.11) (41.55) (60.97) (53.24) (30.63) (4.30) 
       
LogTVOL -0.133*** -0.331*** -0.229*** -0.123*** -0.0394*** 0.0290*** 
 (-21.34) (-26.88) (-35.54) (-25.40) (-8.25) (3.96) 
       
NBASpread -2.669*** -19.16*** -6.054*** -2.531*** -1.216** -0.837 
 (-5.22) (-18.98) (-11.46) (-6.36) (-3.10) (-1.39) 
       
lnVIX -0.245*** -0.768*** -0.269*** -0.0104 0.147*** 0.161*** 
 (-8.59) (-13.65) (-9.14) (-0.47) (6.71) (4.81) 
       
PremDisc 0.00755*** 0.0125*** 0.00870*** 0.00580*** 0.00441** 0.00132 
 (4.32) (3.63) (4.81) (4.26) (3.28) (0.64) 
       
LNetExRetPctg 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.113*** 0.104*** 0.0983*** 0.0972*** 
 (140.45) (70.43) (117.79) (144.43) (137.94) (89.01) 
       
LagFlow -0.000525 -0.00267*** -0.0000888 -0.000317 -0.0000665 -0.000283 
 (-1.40) (-3.60) (-0.23) (-1.09) (-0.23) (-0.64) 
       
NHoldings -0.0000120 0.00000393 -0.0000222 -0.0000328*** -0.0000308*** -0.0000572*** 
 (-1.05) (0.17) (-1.87) (-3.67) (-3.50) (-4.24) 
       
GrowthDum 0.642*** 0.00243 0.275*** 0.664*** 0.900*** 1.027*** 
 (16.88) (0.03) (6.98) (22.42) (30.83) (22.94) 
       
ValueDum 0.331*** -0.280*** -0.0672 0.369*** 0.669*** 0.872*** 
 (9.03) (-3.87) (-1.77) (12.92) (23.76) (20.20) 
       





 (14.81) (-7.56) (-2.86) (19.80) (46.10) (39.37) 
       
IndCapWtD -0.0940*** -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.104*** -0.0885*** -0.0524** 
 (-5.83) (-3.81) (-7.18) (-8.32) (-7.15) (-2.76) 
       
IndEqWtD 0.101*** -0.151** -0.00203 0.121*** 0.143*** 0.195*** 
 (4.30) (-3.23) (-0.08) (6.57) (7.87) (7.02) 
       
_cons -1.172*** -0.901*** -1.100*** -0.863*** -0.630*** 0.115 
 (-14.32) (-5.57) (-12.99) (-13.54) (-10.02) (1.19) 
N 
adj. R-sq 




















Table 4 Panel B: Dependent Variable Carhart Four Factor Alpha:  
 
 (1-OLS) (1-QReg 10th) (2-QReg 25th) (3-QReg 50th) (4-QReg 75th) (5-QReg 90th) 
 Carhart Alpha Carhart Alpha Carhart Alpha Carhart Alpha Carhart Alpha Carhart Alpha 
LogTNA 0.195*** 0.412*** 0.275*** 0.153*** 0.0400*** -0.0628*** 
 (24.80) (27.08) (34.12) (24.86) (6.38) (-5.91) 
       
Expratio -0.916*** -0.803*** -0.966*** -1.057*** -1.026*** -1.048*** 
 (-52.77) (-23.89) (-54.35) (-77.69) (-74.11) (-44.67) 
       
AGE 0.113*** 0.143*** 0.114*** 0.0800*** 0.0494*** 0.0129*** 
 (61.94) (40.45) (60.94) (55.85) (33.86) (5.24) 
       
LogTVOL -0.125*** -0.326*** -0.226*** -0.133*** -0.0415*** 0.0425*** 
 (-19.74) (-26.65) (-35.00) (-26.79) (-8.23) (4.98) 
       
NBASpread -3.141*** -22.57*** -9.797*** -4.656*** -1.232* -1.015 
 (-5.10) (-18.94) (-15.55) (-9.65) (-2.51) (-1.22) 
       
lnVIX -0.187*** -0.664*** -0.223*** 0.0521* 0.227*** 0.275*** 
 (-6.46) (-11.87) (-7.52) (2.30) (9.82) (7.03) 
       
PremDisc 0.00930*** 0.0112** 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 0.00771*** 0.00329 
 (5.05) (3.14) (5.34) (6.99) (5.25) (1.32) 
       
LNetExRetPctg 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.111*** 0.103*** 0.0969*** 0.0957*** 
 (135.41) (70.78) (115.20) (139.82) (128.94) (75.22) 
       
LagFlow -0.000132 0.000115 -0.000106 -0.000231 0.0000115 -0.000212 
 (-0.34) (0.16) (-0.27) (-0.77) (0.04) (-0.41) 
       
NHoldings -0.0000318* -0.000000443 -0.0000251 -0.0000416*** -0.0000543*** -0.0000814*** 
 (-2.49) (-0.02) (-1.92) (-4.16) (-5.34) (-4.73) 
       
GrowthDum 0.683*** 0.137 0.323*** 0.629*** 0.839*** 0.940*** 
 (17.86) (1.85) (8.25) (20.95) (27.48) (18.19) 
       
ValueDum 0.435*** -0.0823 0.0548 0.400*** 0.658*** 0.839*** 
 (11.75) (-1.15) (1.45) (13.79) (22.30) (16.79) 
       
CoreDum 0.344*** -0.146*** 0.0276 0.337*** 0.641*** 0.804*** 
 (17.43) (-3.81) (1.37) (21.77) (40.67) (30.14) 
       





 (-6.58) (-3.54) (-8.08) (-10.05) (-8.33) (-1.20) 
       
IndEqWtD 0.100*** -0.154*** -0.0213 0.0857*** 0.0841*** 0.173*** 
 (4.21) (-3.34) (-0.87) (4.59) (4.43) (5.39) 
       
_cons -1.217*** -0.987*** -1.127*** -1.053*** -0.890*** -0.207 

























In the table, there are two types of significant coefficients: those that are significantly 
different from zero, and those that are significantly different from the OLS coefficients (outside 
of the confidence interval). The graphical visual is more intuitive than in the table to see the 
differences. For example, the coefficient on the log(TNA) at the 10th, 25th, 50th, and 75th  
quantiles are significantly different from zero. The coefficient on the log(TNA) on the 10th and 
90th percentiles are also significantly different from the OLS coefficient. The quantile regression 
results in Table 4-Panel A for CAPM and Panel B for the Carhart four-factor model clearly show 
that the size effect is different for low performing vs. high performing ETFs clusters. The results 
in both the panels have a monotonously decreasing coefficients representing the size impact 
differentials on the increasing order of risk-adjusted performance percentiles. The tables also 
show that ETFs size negatively impacts the high performing ETFs in sharp contrast to the lower 
performing ETF quantiles.  
Size has a strong positive impact on the individual ETFs belonging to the lowest end of the 
quantiles. The observations are consistent in both the panels CAPM and Carhart four-factor risk-
adjusted-performance.  In Panel A, the first specification is from the panel OLS; the second, third, 
fourth, fifth, and sixth specifications are from the quantile regression corresponding to the 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile of CAPM alpha. As shown from the table, at the 10th 
percentile, it has a positive coefficient of 0.429 whereas at the 90th percentile, it is negative 
0.0634. Clearly, high performing ETFs have an inverse relation with the size, whereas the low 
performing ETFs have a positive relationship with the size.  When it comes to expense ratio, it 
has a negative relationship with the alpha in all the quantiles; however, the high performing ETFs 





the highest performing percentile ETFs have the least negative impact of illiquidity, where is the 
lowest-performing percentile has the strongest negative impact of illiquidity. The results are very 
similar in Panel B for the Carhart four factor-alpha. 
I present the coefficients from the quantile regressions in the graphs. As shown in the 
figures for Table 4 Panels A(figure 2) and B(figure 3),  the quantiles of the dependent variable are 
on the horizontal axis and the coefficient magnitudes on the vertical axis. The OLS coefficient is 
plotted as a horizontal line with the confidence interval (see two horizontal lines around the 
coefficient line). The OLS coefficient does not vary by quantiles. The quantile regression 
coefficients are plotted as lines varying across the quantiles with confidence intervals around 
them. If the quantile coefficient is outside the OLS confidence interval, then I have significant 
differences between the quantile and OLS coefficients. The graph shows that the quantile 
coefficients for the independent variable (log of TNA) on risk-adjusted alpha (dependent variable) 
are significantly different from the OLS coefficients. Moreover, the effect of the log of TNA 
gradually decreases along the quantiles for individual ETFs with lower performance to individual 






































The results from the quantile regression is consistent with the results from the cross-
sectional regression.  I support Petajisto (2013) findings that larger funds are more likely to be 
closet indexers who earn inferior returns, implying that the indexation strategies employed by 
larger funds drive the poor returns earned by these funds.  
 
Section B: Scale Effect on Tracking Error Performance  
 
Wermers (2003) uses tracking error to measure fund performance and claims that it is 
positively related to the contemporaneous fund alpha. Cremers & Petajisto (2009), on the other 
hand, argue that tracking error represents the active share fraction of portfolio holdings that 
differ from the passive benchmark index, thus emphasizing stock selection. These papers study 
the index mutual funds, and the focus is on ETFs. I argue that tracking error is the volatility of 
fund return in excess of the benchmark, so it emphasizes beta risk. Therefore, it is important to 
see the scale effect on tracking errors as well. 
I extend the following Rompotis (2012) model to estimate the tracking error : 
𝑻𝑬 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟐 𝒍𝒏𝑻𝑵𝑨 +  𝜶𝟑𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 + 𝜶𝟒 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒖𝒎 + 𝜶𝟓 𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 + 𝜶𝟔 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 +  ɛ   
where, 
The tracking error is the dependent variable:  σɛ = Stdev [RETF  − RBenchMarkIndex ]  
The discount or premium is the difference between the NAV – (price*shares outstanding).   
Risk is proxied using the historical volatility of the asset. 
 The main independent variable is the lagged asset size  
Control variables are Expense Ratio, Liquidity, Flow, Age, Number of Holdings, NAV, Historical Volatility, and Lagged Fund Flow.  
The results in Table 5 show that size has a marginal effect on the tracking ability of ETFs 
against their benchmark index. The 10th percentile of the TE has a stronger negative relationship 
with the size; however, other quantiles appears to be within the margin of a confidence interval.  
The coefficient of ‘logTNA’ is negative in all the quantiles that mean size has a marginal negative 
impact on the tracking error. The quantile graph(figure 4) underneath the table also clearly shows 





expense ratio both have statistically significant positive relation in all the quantiles that suggest 
higher the illiquidity spread higher the tracking error. The same is the case for the expense ratio 
that higher the expense ratio higher the tracking error.   
 
Table 5 -Impact of Size on Tracking Error 
In this table, I investigate the impact of ETF size on the tracking error of ETFs. Tracking error is the std of differences 
between the ETF return percentage minus the underlying benchmark return percentage. The main independent variable is 
the ETF size measured by log of the total net asset(TNA) in millions of dollars. Expense Ratio is   the total annual management 
fees and expenses divided by year-end TNA. Liquidity is proxied from normalized bid-ask price spread.  Flow is the percentage of 
new fund flow into the Exchange Traded Fund over the period under investigation. Age is the number of years since the 
establishment of the ETF. The number of Holdings is the number of stocks in an ETF. NAV is the net asset value. Volume Turn Over 
is the total trade transactions that occurred in a month. Historical Volatility is the five-year standard deviation of the asset return. 
Premium/Discount is the difference of the NAV and the current market value of the ETFs. Lagged variables indicated are the 
previous time period value for the respective variables. The Net Asset Return is the monthly ETF return after the expense ratio. 
The ETF sample is from January 2009 to December 2018. I include non-leveraged equity, only ETFs with TNA more than $15 
million. I exclude the control variables that are statistically insignificant. I extend the following Rompotis (2012) model to 
estimate the tracking error:  𝑻𝑬 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟐 𝒍𝒏𝑻𝑵𝑨 +  𝜶𝟑𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 +  𝜶𝟓 𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 + 𝜶𝟔 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 +  ɛ   where the 
tracking error is  𝜎ɛ = Stdev [𝑅ETF  −  𝑅BenchMarkIndex ] . Risk is proxied using the standard deviation of the five-year 
historical volatility of the asset returns. The first specification in the below is from the OLS regression, and the next five 
columns are from the quantile regression for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and the 90th percentiles. 
 
 
 OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 absTE absTE absTE absTE absTE absTE 
LogTNA -0.0289*** -0.00516** -0.0124*** -0.0290*** -0.0143 -0.0307 
 (-4.34) (-3.04) (-4.83) (-5.05) (-1.34) (-1.57) 
       
Expratio 0.0954*** 0.0117*** 0.0246*** 0.0907*** 0.143*** 0.177*** 
 (17.37) (8.38) (11.60) (19.12) (16.19) (11.00) 
       
HistVol -0.357*** -0.0123 -0.0677 -0.261** -0.781*** -0.786** 
 (-3.44) (-0.47) (-1.69) (-2.91) (-4.70) (-2.59) 
       
LogTVOL 0.0187*** 0.00110 0.00297 0.00971* 0.0143 0.0304* 
 (3.68) (0.85) (1.51) (2.22) (1.76) (2.04) 
       
LogSpread 0.0442*** 0.000810 0.00554* 0.0137** 0.0728*** 0.118*** 
 (7.18) (0.52) (2.33) (2.58) (7.38) (6.56) 
       
_cons 0.711*** 0.0595*** 0.183*** 0.426*** 1.022*** 1.656*** 
 (15.83) (5.20) (10.57) (10.99) (14.20) (12.58) 
N 













t statistics in parentheses 














I reconfirm the results from the quantile regression in Table 5 with the regression using 
bootstrapped observations, and I find a consistent result. The results are similar to  Chu (2009) 
study that documents that the magnitude of the tracking errors has a negative relation to the 
size of ETFs. Likewise, as I reported, Chu’s paper also documents a positive relation to the 







Study 3: Interaction of investment factors on ETF size and their impact on the excess return 
performance  
 
In Table 6, I study the interaction effects of the ETF size (log of TNA) with the various fund 
attributes, investment styles, and the fund types.  I generalize the cross-sectional model with the 
interaction term as in equation 4.2 below in which excess return is the dependent variable, and 
the log of total net asset is the independent variable.  Equation 4.1 reflects the base model with 
no interaction term. 
𝑅𝑖 - 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼 + β (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡)  +   δ𝑖 𝑋𝑖  + ɛ𝑖    ---  Equation  ( 4.1 ) 
  𝑅𝑖 - 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼 + β (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡)  + β𝑖 * δ (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡) * (𝑍𝑖) +   δ𝑖 𝑋𝑖  + ɛ𝑖    ---  Equation  ( 4.2 ) 
Where  
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦  
𝑍𝑖   𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 
𝑋𝑖  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
 
I examine the interaction effect of ‘𝑍𝑖′ and log(TNA) on ETFs excess return performance where, 
‘𝑍𝑖
′   represent fund attributes such as liquidity, expense ratio, volume turnover, age, number of 
holdings, and historical volatility,  and dummies for investment styles (such as growth, value, and 
core) and the fund types (such as small, medium and large-cap).  Panel A of Table 6 reports the 
results for liquidity interaction, expense ratio interaction, trading volume interaction, age 
interaction, historical volatility interaction, and the number of holdings interaction. In the Table, 
specification 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 have the corresponding interaction term. Specification 1 is the 
base model without interactions. Likewise, Panel B of Table 6 reports  the results for   investment 
styles dummies – growth, value and core/blend, and the index composition dummies – 
capitalization weighted and the equal weighted composition. In the Table, specification 2, 3, 4, 








Table 6 Factors Affecting Size vs Performance Relationship 
(Examining the interaction effect of various investment factors on the relationship between the ETF size and the net excess returns) 
 
In table 6, I examine effect of  interaction between the  ‘𝑋𝑖′ and the  ETF size on its net excess return performance,  where 𝑋𝑖  are liquidity, expense ratio, trading volume, number 
of holdings, age and the historical volatility. I also included dummies for investment styles(value, growth, core blend), cap types( small, medium, large), and the  index comp osition 
weight (equal weight, capitalization weight). I use cross-sectional OLS regression methodology as outlined in the following equations to study the interaction effects.  TNA is the 
total net assets under management in millions of dollars. Expense Ratio is  the total annual management fees and expenses divided by year-end TNA. Liquidity is proxied from normalized bid-
ask price spread.  Flow is the percentage of new fund flow into the Exchange Traded Fund over the period under investigation. Age is the number of years since the establishment of the 
ETF. The number of Holdings is the number of stocks in an ETF. NAV is the net asset value. Volume Turn Over is the total trade transactions that occurred in a month. Historical Volatility is 
the five-year standard deviation of the asset return. Premium/Discount is the difference between the NAV and the current market value of the ETFs. Lagged variables indicated are previous 
time period value for the respective variables. The Net Asset Return is the monthly ETF return after the expense ratio. The ETF sample is from January 2009 to December 2018. I include 
non-leveraged equity only ETFs with TNA more than $15 million. The dependent variable is the net excess return. The main independent variable is the size (Log of TNA). I exclude 















No. Of Hold Int. 
 
 Net Excess Return Net Excess Return Net Excess Return Net Excess Return Net Excess Return Net Excess Return Net Excess Return 
lntna 0.438*** -0.0620 0.485*** 0.300*** -0.181*** 0.387*** 0.439*** 
 (32.75) (-1.66) (33.45) (13.01) (-5.11) (6.10) (32.61) 
        
lnnbaspread -0.219*** 0.180*** -0.215*** -0.222*** -0.210*** -0.219*** -0.219*** 
 (-16.08) (5.82) (-15.81) (-16.30) (-15.56) (-16.05) (-16.08) 
        
expratio -0.193*** -0.186*** 0.629*** -0.186*** -0.181*** -0.193*** -0.193*** 
 (-6.42) (-6.21) (6.08) (-6.18) (-6.07) (-6.42) (-6.42) 
        
lnage 0.456*** 0.458*** 0.467*** 0.458*** -1.043*** 0.457*** 0.456*** 
 (14.68) (14.82) (15.02) (14.74) (-12.25) (14.69) (14.67) 
        
lntradingvol -0.384*** -0.386*** -0.374*** -0.492*** -0.402*** -0.384*** -0.384*** 
 (-38.85) (-39.21) (-37.65) (-27.85) (-40.82) (-38.86) (-38.83) 
        
lnnumberofholdings -0.0322*** -0.0388*** -0.0373*** -0.0348*** -0.0414*** -0.0322*** -0.0301** 
 (-4.11) (-4.97) (-4.76) (-4.45) (-5.32) (-4.12) (-3.22) 
        
lnvix 0.186*** 0.176*** 0.182*** 0.186*** 0.196*** 0.0711 0.186*** 
 (4.31) (4.09) (4.22) (4.31) (4.57) (0.49) (4.31) 
        
lagnetexcessreturn 0.0639*** 0.0637*** 0.0624*** 0.0658*** 0.0622*** 0.0638*** 0.0639*** 
 (9.51) (9.53) (9.30) (9.81) (9.35) (9.51) (9.51) 
        
growthdum 0.549*** 0.543*** 0.526*** 0.564*** 0.475*** 0.549*** 0.546*** 





        
valuedum 0.171** 0.167** 0.154** 0.178** 0.0816 0.172** 0.168** 
 (3.02) (2.96) (2.72) (3.14) (1.45) (3.02) (2.94) 
        
coredum 0.112*** 0.0987*** 0.115*** 0.104*** 0.0778** 0.112*** 0.110*** 
 (4.15) (3.66) (4.25) (3.85) (2.89) (4.14) (4.00) 
        
indxcompcapwtdum 0.197*** 0.181*** 0.167*** 0.194*** 0.176*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 
 (7.99) (7.36) (6.69) (7.85) (7.19) (7.98) (8.00) 
        
indxcompeqwtdum 0.195*** 0.198*** 0.178*** 0.186*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.196*** 
 (5.12) (5.25) (4.69) (4.91) (5.23) (5.11) (5.13) 
        
lntnaspread_int  -0.0686***      
  (-14.37)      
        
lntnaexpratio_int   -0.165***     
   (-8.30)     
        
lntnatradingvol_int    0.0175***    
    (7.38)    
        
lntnaage_int     0.263***   
     (18.89)   
        
lntnavix_int      0.0192  
      (0.83)  
        
lntnanumberofholdings_int       -0.00000102 
       (-0.40) 
        
_cons -3.329*** -0.433 -3.583*** -2.534*** 0.356 -3.020*** -3.339*** 

















t statistics in parentheses 





























 Net Excess Return Net Excess Return Net Excess Return Net Excess Return Net Excess Return Net Excess Return 
lntna 0.438*** 0.434*** 0.436*** 0.394*** 0.408*** 0.438*** 
 (32.75) (32.20) (32.34) (24.84) (26.73) (32.51) 
       
lnnbaspread -0.219*** -0.219*** -0.219*** -0.217*** -0.217*** -0.219*** 
 (-16.08) (-16.11) (-16.10) (-15.96) (-15.89) (-16.07) 
       
expratio -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.195*** -0.187*** -0.193*** 
 (-6.42) (-6.40) (-6.41) (-6.49) (-6.20) (-6.42) 
       
lnage 0.456*** 0.457*** 0.454*** 0.449*** 0.452*** 0.456*** 
 (14.68) (14.71) (14.60) (14.44) (14.52) (14.68) 
       
lntradingvol -0.384*** -0.383*** -0.384*** -0.386*** -0.385*** -0.384*** 
 (-38.85) (-38.71) (-38.78) (-39.06) (-38.94) (-38.77) 
       
lnnumberofholdings -0.0322*** -0.0315*** -0.0320*** -0.0338*** -0.0362*** -0.0321*** 
 (-4.11) (-4.02) (-4.08) (-4.32) (-4.59) (-4.09) 
       
lnvix 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 
 (4.31) (4.30) (4.32) (4.26) (4.31) (4.31) 
       
lagnetexcessreturn 0.0639*** 0.0629*** 0.0637*** 0.0649*** 0.0635*** 0.0638*** 
 (9.51) (9.35) (9.49) (9.67) (9.45) (9.50) 
       
growthdum 0.549*** 0.107 0.552*** 0.595*** 0.554*** 0.549*** 
 (9.45) (0.52) (9.49) (10.12) (9.52) (9.45) 
       
valuedum 0.171** 0.173** -0.0795 0.204*** 0.181** 0.172** 
 (3.02) (3.05) (-0.43) (3.58) (3.19) (3.02) 
       
coredum 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.112*** -0.280*** 0.118*** 0.112*** 
 (4.15) (4.12) (4.16) (-3.50) (4.35) (4.15) 
       
indxcompcapwtdum 0.197*** 0.195*** 0.198*** 0.204*** -0.109 0.198*** 
 (7.99) (7.88) (8.00) (8.25) (-1.41) (7.97) 
       
indxcompeqwtdum 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.185*** 0.185 





       
lntnagrowthdum_int  0.0657*     
  (2.24)     
       
lntnavaluedum_int   0.0389    
   (1.42)    
       
lntnacoredum_int    0.0673***   
    (5.21)   
       
lntnaindxcompcapwtdum_int     0.0529***  
     (4.19)  
       
lntnaindxcompeqwtdum_int      0.00172 
      (0.08) 
       
_cons -3.329*** -3.320*** -3.320*** -3.016*** -3.116*** -3.329*** 
















t statistics in parentheses 





The results in Table 6 shows that the spread and expense ratio have the highest negative impact 
on size vs. performance relationship. In panel A, spec 2 shows the spread interaction, spec 3 
shows the expense ratio interaction, spec 4 shows the trading volume interaction, spec 5 shows the 
age interaction, spec 6 shows the vix interaction, and spec 7 shows the number of holdings 
interaction. The result reports that the spread, and expense ratio negatively affects the size vs. 
performance relationship. While trading volume, and age positively affect the size vs. performance 
relationship. VIX and the number of holdings, however, have an insignificant effect.  
In panel B, I test the interaction effect of investment style – growth, value and core, and 
fund types – equal-weighted and capitalization-weighted.  Spec 2 has the growth dummy 
interaction, spec 3 has value dummy interaction, spec 4 has the core dummy interaction, spec 5 
has the capitalization-weighted index composition interaction, and spec 6 has the equal-
weighted index composition interaction. Core-blend style interaction positively affects the size 
vs. performance relationship; however, the ‘growth’ and the ‘value’  interaction show 
insignificant. Likewise, capitalization-weighted index interaction shows a statistically positive 
effect, while equal-weighted index interaction shows insignificant effect. 
Yan(2008) finds that illiquidity worsens the size vs. performance relationship. The paper 
argues that if fund size erodes fund performance because of illiquidity, then the coefficient on 
the interaction term should be significantly negative. And it indicates that the fund size erodes 
performance more among funds that are less liquid. I find a statistically significant negative 
coefficient on the spread interaction with a size, and I confirm that the price spread worsens the 
size performance relationship in ETFs as well. I find a very similar result for the expense ratio as 
well, indicating that the higher expense ratio augments the inverse relationship of size vs. 
performance.  
In Table 7, I perform robust testing for the scale effect on ETF performance. In this Table, 
I use the full ETF sample, excluding the active ETFs. I sort the full sample and create four size 
categories. Then I create an interaction term of size categories with log(TNA). I use risk-adjusted 
alpha (CAPM and Carhart Four Factor) as the dependent variable. I examine the interaction effect 






Table 7 Impact of Size Category Interaction on Risk-Adjusted Alpha 
Table 7 shows the cross-sectional regression estimates of the risk-adjusted alpha on the full sample regressed on ETF size 
measured by total net asset size (logTNA). Unlike in table 3, here I examine the interaction effect of four size categories using OLS 
(with clustered standard errors on ETFID) and Fama McBeth regression. TNA is the total net assets under management in millions 
of dollars. Expense Ratio is  the total annual management fees and expenses divided by year-end TNA. Liquidity is proxied from 
normalized bid-ask price spread.  Flow is the percentage of new fund flow into the Exchange Traded Fund over period under 
investigation. Age is the number of years since the establishment of the ETF. Number of Holdings is the number of stocks in an 
ETF. NAV is the net asset value. Volume Turn Over is the total trade transactions that occurred in a month. Historical Volatility is 
the five-year standard deviation of the asset return. Premium/Discount is the difference of the NAV and the current market value 
of the ETFs. Lagged variables indicated are the previous time period value for the respective variables. Gross excess return is the 
asset return minus risk-free rate before the expense ratio, and the Net Asset Return is the monthly ETF return after expense ratio. 
The ETF sample is from January 2009 to December 2018. I include non-leveraged equity, only ETFs with TNA more than $15 
million. I sort the total net assets to create four different size categories. The dependent variables are the CAPM Alpha and the 
four-factor Carhart Alpha. The main independent variable is the size of the asset under management measured by log( TNA), and 
control variables are Expense Ratio, Fund Age, Liquidity,  Trading Volume Turnover, Number of Holdings, Historical Volatility, 
Lagged Excess Return, and the  Lagged Fund Flow. I control for investment styles and fund type dummies.  Spec 1 thru spec 4 are 


















 alpha_capm alpha_capm alpha_capm alpha_capm alpha_4f alpha_4f alpha_4f alpha_4f 
LogTNA 0.147*** 0.428*** 0.0663 0.235*** 0.205*** 0.474*** 0.107** 0.282*** 
 (4.34) (6.51) (1.82) (4.29) (5.89) (6.78) (3.09) (5.89) 
         
Expratio -0.874*** -0.879*** -0.757*** -0.757*** -0.909*** -0.912*** -1.041*** -1.037*** 
 (-14.93) (-15.00) (-7.97) (-7.99) (-15.49) (-15.78) (-11.99) (-12.03) 
         
AGE 0.0756*** 0.0752*** 0.00857 0.00861 0.0740*** 0.0736*** 0.0353* 0.0356* 
 (8.50) (8.45) (0.52) (0.52) (8.51) (8.45) (2.36) (2.38) 
         
LogTVOL -0.134*** -0.132*** -0.0575* -0.0573* -0.149*** -0.148*** -0.0958*** -0.0966*** 
 (-4.95) (-4.87) (-2.60) (-2.62) (-5.50) (-5.41) (-4.57) (-4.62) 
         
LogNHold -0.0219 -0.0227 -0.0433*** -0.0437*** -0.0516* -0.0529* -0.0445*** -0.0449*** 
 (-1.04) (-1.08) (-5.82) (-6.08) (-2.27) (-2.33) (-5.31) (-5.36) 
         
HistVol 0.905 0.888 -0.733* -0.739* -0.502 -0.517 -0.253 -0.255 
 (1.71) (1.67) (-2.05) (-2.07) (-0.86) (-0.88) (-0.58) (-0.59) 
         
LogSpread -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.132*** -0.136*** -0.0829*** -0.0839*** -0.151*** -0.154*** 
 (-6.78) (-6.88) (-11.08) (-11.29) (-4.89) (-4.95) (-12.34) (-12.71) 
         
LNetExRet 9.397*** 9.377*** 6.481*** 6.465*** 10.81*** 10.80*** 5.238*** 5.230*** 
 (30.36) (30.44) (7.40) (7.41) (39.31) (39.37) (5.35) (5.35) 
         
GrowthDum 0.630*** 0.639*** 0.825*** 0.830*** 0.697*** 0.703*** 0.672*** 0.674*** 
 (5.09) (5.22) (12.65) (12.77) (5.67) (5.77) (9.75) (9.73) 
         
ValueDum 0.150 0.154 0.344*** 0.345*** 0.374* 0.376* 0.326** 0.327** 
 (0.98) (1.01) (4.14) (4.15) (2.49) (2.52) (3.32) (3.34) 
         
CoreDum 0.183 0.187* 0.393*** 0.397*** 0.345*** 0.348*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 
 (1.92) (1.98) (7.77) (7.83) (3.48) (3.53) (5.51) (5.46) 
         
IndCapWtD -0.111 -0.111 -0.00151 -0.00190 -0.199** -0.198** -0.196*** -0.195*** 
 (-1.61) (-1.62) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-2.98) (-2.98) (-3.80) (-3.77) 
         
IndEqWtD 0.0673 0.0556 0.0654** 0.0594** 0.0399 0.0316 -0.0478 -0.0494 
 (0.54) (0.45) (3.06) (2.80) (0.34) (0.27) (-1.25) (-1.29) 
         
lntnasizecat
_int 
 -0.0456***  -0.0273***  -0.0433***  -0.0279*** 
  (-5.08)  (-6.06)  (-4.73)  (-6.94) 
         


















t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
The result of Table 7 indicates a statistically significant negative interaction term for both 
the CAPM as well as the Carhart four factor alpha. Further, the result from the cross-sectional 
OLS regression and from the Fama-McBeth regression are consistent. This is an additional 
empirical evidence that there is a negative effect of size on the ETFs risk-adjusted-performance.   
Thus, the findings from this study are largely in align with the existing results in the ETFs 
literature. Svetina (2015) document that, on average, ETFs underperform their benchmark 
indices and are not immune to tracking error. The paper mentions that only 17% of all ETFs 
directly compete with index funds; those that do, provide returns that are, for the most part, 
statistically indistinguishable from those provided by matched index funds54. Likewise, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2017)55 report that retail traders who invest in ETFs perform worse than 
retail traders who stick with traditional funds. They argue that the ease of ETF trading leads retail 
investors to attempt to time the market that results in poor performance.  Similarly, Glushkov 
(2016)  examines the performance of a smaller sample of smart beta ETFs and document a poor 
performance for factor ETFs compared to their mutual fund counterparts. With all these 
evidences, I conclude that the investment appeal of ETFs has weak empirical support in the data 
even though they have some competitive advantage in terms of trading, tax efficiency, and 
flexibility. In terms of risk-adjusted performance, there is no convincing empirical evidence that 
the ETFs can beat the conventional actively managed funds or the broader market index. 
 
 
54 Svetina, Marko, Exchange Traded Funds: Performance and Competition (November 19, 2015). Journal of Applied 
Finance (Formerly Financial Practice and Education), Vol. 20, No. 2, 2010.  
55 Bhattacharya, Utpal, Benjamin Loos, Steffen Meyer, and Andreas Hackethal, 2017, Abusing ETFs, Review of 







In this paper, I make a comprehensive evaluation of a scale to returns hypothesis focusing 
on exchange-traded funds. Unlike most extant literature, I use quantile regression to examine 
the differentials in size impact on fund performances.  I provide a robust result that ETFs do not 
provide increasing returns to scale; instead, I observe steady diminishing returns to scale. I 
observe slightly positive risk-adjusted returns initially when the asset base is growing; however, 
the positive effect disappears as the fund size grows.  Zhu(2018) states that in a decreasing return 
to scale world, a positive alpha indicates that investors have not given enough money to a 
particular fund, while a negative net alpha suggests that investors have given the fund too much 
money. Consistent with this view, the result shows that at the lower end of the size quantiles, 
the risk-adjusted alpha is positive, and at the higher end of size quantiles, the alpha is turning in 
to negative. 
Furthermore, the quantile regression results show that ETFs size has a stronger negative 
impact on the high performing quantiles. In contrast, it shows a positive impact on the individual 
ETFs belonging to the lowest end of the quantiles. The results are consistent in both the quantile 
as well as in the cross-sectional regression. Moreover, patterns are steady for CAPM and for 
Carhart four-factor risk-adjusted-performance. The robust testing result with size category 
interaction also shows a statistically significant negative impact on ETFs performance. The study 
support Zhu (2018) findings that documents a decreasing return to scale at the fund level, 
implying that the fund alpha and the fund size are not two independent entities.  When it comes 
to the tracking error ability of the ETFs, the result shows that the tracking error has a negative 
relationship with the size56; however, the size impact is within the margin of the confidence 
interval.  
Further, I provide evidence that spread (illiquidity) and expense ratios are the two main 
factors that worsen the size vs. performance relationship. This finding is consistent with the 
conventional fund research of Yan (2008). I observe that the higher the illiquidity, the stronger 
 





the negative effect of size on performance. However, I find that trading volume, age, and 
historical volatility positively affect the scale performance relationship. Likewise, ETFs with core 
blend investment styles positively affect the size performance relationship. The growth and value 
investment style have insignificant or weak effect. Finally, the capitalization-weighted index has 
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Appendix B (Chapter 2) 
 
Appendix B: Table A  -  Variable Selection: 
Variable Name Proxy for Brief information Data Source 
pricesp500 S&P500 Monthly Time Series 
Price 
S&P500 is generally considered 
broader US stock market 
Thomson Reuters Datasreams 
marketreturn S&P500 monthly return Calculated as change in monthly 
market price divided by previous 
month market price expressed in 
percentage 
Derived Variable 
price ETF monthly time series price  Thomson Reuters Datasreams 
grossreturn ETF gross return Calculated as change in monthly asset 
price divided by previous month asset 
price expressed in percentage 
Derived Variable 
expenseratio Expense Ratio ETF operating Cost Morning Star 
netreturn Gross Return minus Expense 
Ratio 
Monthly net asset return is after all 
costs 
Derived Variable 
tna Total Net Asset Total asset under management Morning Star 
logtna ETF Size  Size as measured by total net asset Derived Variable 
nav Net asset value Total asset dividend by shares 
outstanding 
Thomson Reuters Datasreams 
premDiscount Premium or Discount Difference in net asset value minus 
market value 
Derived Variable 
bidprice Bid Price Monthly time series of ETF bid price Thomson Reuters Datasreams 
askprice Ask Price Monthly time series of ETF ask price Thomson Reuters Datasreams 
baspread Bid-Ask Spread (Normalized) 
(Hameed, JF 2010)  
(Ask Price-Bid price)/midpoint of bid 
price plus ask price 
Derived Variable 
Nosh Number of shares 
outstanding 
 Thomson Reuters Datasreams 
logfundflow Log of Monthly Total Fund 
Flow into ETF 
𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = (𝑛𝑜𝑠ℎ𝑡  − 𝑛𝑜𝑠ℎ𝑡−1)/ 𝑛𝑜𝑠ℎ𝑡−1 Derived Variable 
logage Log of ETF age in Years Current year minus year of inception Morning Star 
lgnumofholdings Stock Holdings in a ETF  Morning Star 
histvol Asset risk Five-year standard deviation of return Thomson Reuters Datasreams 
volturnover Volume Turnover total monthly buying and selling 
transactions 
Thomson Reuters Datasreams 
Vix Market Risk or Volatility market risk as measured by VIX 
 
Thomson Reuters Datasreams 
riskfreerate Risk free rate US treasury 30-day note. I use the 
data from Fama French Website 
Fama French Website 
mrktrf Market factor risk Fama French Factor – market factor Fama French Website 
shb Value factor risk Fama French Factor – small minus big Fama French Website 
hml Size factor risk Fama French Factor – high minus low Fama French Website 
mom Momentum factor risk Carhart – Momentum Factor Fama French Website 
valuegrowth Investment Style Growth, value Morning Star 
largesmall Fund size category Large Cap, Small Cap Morning Star 
passiveactive Management Style Active, Passive, Enhanced 
 
Morning Star 





lagfundflow Lagged ETF Flow Previous month fund flow Derived Variable 
lagsize Lagged ETF Size Log of previous month total net asset Derived Variable 
te Tracking Error Standard deviation of the difference 
between the asset and the underlying 
benchmark returns, 𝜎ɛ = Stdev 
[𝑅ETF  − 𝑅BenchMarkIndex ]     
 
Derived Variable 
indexprice Price of underlying Index Time series price of index  
 
 
Appendix B: Table B  -  Size and Performance Trend Over the Sample Duration 
Panel A - TNA Quantiles Over the Years  
    year  mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
2009 1248.811 66.8 181.4 643.5 2334.4 20055.2 
2010 1398.509 67.85 201.9 705.3 2821.8 23121.1 
2011 1563.955 79.65 229.25 762.8999 3131.5 27172.7 
2012 1636.85 72.05 230.7 778.2 3158.1 31021.9 
2013 1851.148 79.6 251 925.7 3849.2 33645.1 
2014 1977.541 89.4 276.1 982.2 3960.1 30096.9 
2015 2078.171 88.6 275.65 1020 4273.797 29114.2 
2016 2086.856 79.2 249.1 915.2 4142.199 31589.6 
2017 2609.898 90.5 306 1171.6 4810.398 37746.8 
2018 3042.126 100.1 368.5 1453.45 5602.349 46685.5 
   Total  2085.474 82.7 264.5 996.3999 3968 33976.1 
Panel B - Net Excess Return Quantiles Over the Years    
    year  mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
2009 0.0114398 -0.0349601 0.0188323 0.0736269 0.1305012 0.232123 
2010 -0.0034176 -0.037269 0.0014172 0.0371665 0.0708502 0.1218805 
2011 -0.0110778 -0.0443068 -0.0031335 0.0244069 0.0610661 0.1625025 
2012 -0.0032679 -0.0243842 -0.0026477 0.0266561 0.0601558 0.1246376 
2013 0.0074021 -0.0159498 0.0076303 0.035831 0.061945 0.1030466 
2014 -0.0013768 -0.0253829 0.0035291 0.0267232 0.0502888 0.0975321 
2015 -0.0102625 -0.0328296 -0.0080646 0.0134781 0.0533422 0.1170547 
2016 -0.0201768 -0.0432178 -0.0198448 0.0052093 0.033932 0.1156501 
2017 -0.0584052 -0.0844144 -0.0613 -0.0348824 -0.0087778 0.0336824 
2018 -0.1565181 -0.1878579 -0.1561113 -0.1209486 -0.0931186 -0.0352769 
   Total  -0.0337944 -0.0748996 -0.0203234 0.0141527 0.0490078 0.1347734 
Panel C- Four-Factors Carhart Alpha Quantiles Over the Years   
    year  mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
2009 -0.037666 -0.0407636 -0.020269 -0.0075654 0.0064792 0.0614347 
2010 -0.0035605 -0.011646 -0.0030459 0.005683 0.0157814 0.0534621 
2011 -0.0001848 -0.0067722 0.0002029 0.008132 0.0155141 0.0334173 





2013 -0.0012837 -0.0061213 -0.0002483 0.0049606 0.0093819 0.031976 
2014 0.0032384 -0.0032599 0.0032911 0.0091246 0.0147392 0.0376023 
2015 0.0006232 -0.0048671 0.0017683 0.0076949 0.0118722 0.020963 
2016 -0.005147 -0.0104997 -0.0038675 0.0029204 0.0061869 0.0113456 
2017 -0.0108163 -0.0168471 -0.0090006 -0.0019668 0.0019976 0.0063716 
2018 -0.0291395 -0.0367425 -0.0220299 -0.0133426 -0.0074679 -0.000857 
   Total  -0.0075597 -0.0136465 -0.0039806 0.0036634 0.0095016 0.0277087 
 
 
Appendix B: Table C  - Key differences between the Mutual Fund and the ETF   
 Mutual Fund ETF 
Expense Ratio, Fees 
and loads 
Vary but are typically higher than ETFs, 
may charge frontend fees 
Common active exposures such as growth and value are 
available at low cost 
Subscription & 
redemption costs 
Typically paid from fund assets Paid by broker creating or redeeming the ETF 
Liquidity All transactions occur at the close and at 
the fund’s NAV 
Liquidity available intraday.  
Two levels of liquidity – in the primary market due to 
creation/redemption process and in the secondary market due 
to intraday buy/sell activity in the exchanges   
Taxes Redemption gains are borne by remaining 
shareholders in the fund 
In-kind transaction do not incur capital gains taxes.  Bernstein 
(2001) demonstrates the tax advantages of ETFs in comparison 
to traditional mutual funds. 
Transparency Required quarterly but may be available at 
higher frequencies 
Required daily 
Trading/Access Required set up with the mutual fund 
manager 
Bought or sold from any brokerage account like individual 
stocks 
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